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Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law
David Fontana* and Aziz Z. Huq*
Abstract
In Federalist 51, James Madison offered what has become the canonical account
of how the separation of powers would pit branch against branch for the greater
good. The officials of an institution would act on behalf of their institution for the
Constitution to function properly. In Madison’s account, ensuring the presence of
the right amount of institutional loyalties would serve as a durable and plausible
mechanism enforcing institutional boundaries and ensuring a stable
constitutional order. But modern scholars take a more skeptical view of his
theory. This Article reconsiders institutional loyalty as an object of analysis for
constitutional scholars and jurists. Its core thesis is that institutional loyalty can
be identified, evaluated and elicited through conscious institutional design. We
first provide a definition of institutional loyalty, and situate the concept in the
American constitutional past and present. We then marshal evidence that
institutional loyalty can be decisive in some contemporary inter-branch dynamics,
even if its effects are inconstant and asymmetrical. We further argue that it is a
mistake to view institutional loyalties as a constitutional end in themselves.
Rather, institutional loyalty can promote or undermine structural constitutional
goals, depending on the circumstances. Calibrating the appropriate mix of such
loyalties across the branches therefore presents a considerable, if unavoidable,
array of challenges. To that end, the Article offers a taxonomy of causal
mechanisms by which institutional loyalty can be generated within each of the
three branches. Working branch-by-branch, we identify examples of institutional
reforms capable of modifying institutional loyalty in ways that could promote
widely shared constitutional ends.
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Introduction
The Constitution’s separation of powers posits the existence of three distinct and separate
branches.1 Each was initially imagined to act as a “self-executing safeguard against the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”2 In a famous
passage in Federalist No. 51, James Madison amplified this pivotal causal mechanism.
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition” he explained, “[t]he interests of the man must
be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”3 In this key passage, Madison invoked
the institutional loyalty of officials—their tendency to identify with, and to act in ways that
promote their home institution—as a central dynamo of branch autonomy and healthy interbranch friction. Relying on these loyalties, he predicted that fractious interactions between
branches fomented by this institutional loyalty would, in net, enhance individual liberty.4 At the
same time, Madison recognized that voters would at times be driven by partisan, ideological, or
even material “passions” that clouded their respect for these institutional boundaries.5 In these
moments, he suggested, officials’ loyalty to their home institutions would shelter valued
institutional norms against the fickle tides of popular sentiment. 6
A recent wave of empirically informed and theoretically sophisticated scholarship has
challenged the significance of this optimistic Madisonian equilibrium. This scholarship has
powerfully questioned the Framers’ optimistic account of rivalrous branches led by zealous
empire-builders, casting it as rarely existing in practice and therefore difficult to create as a
matter of institutional design. Particularly now that our two political parties are ideologically
homogeneous, the modern skeptics contend, our national political-party system has “tied the
power and political fortunes of government officials to issues and elections,” and thereby
fostered “a set of incentives that rendered these officials largely indifferent to the powers and
interests of the branches per se.”7 They predict that officials will have an “array” of interests, but
1

Humphrey's Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (“The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of
the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,
of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question.”).
2
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam); accord Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 860 (1986).
3
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319-20 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987) (advocating “giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the
others”).
4
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (arguing that the separation of powers “protect[s] each branch of
government from incursion by the others,” and thereby “protect[s] the individual”); accord Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (“The Framers' inherent distrust of governmental power was the driving force behind the
constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make
Government accountable but also to secure individual liberty.”); For a similar recent statement to the same effect,
see NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct 2550, 2559 (2014) (“We recognize, of course, that the separation of powers
can serve to safeguard individual liberty.”)
5
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987) (“The PASSIONS . . . . of the public
would sit in judgment . . . . mere declarations in the written constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several
departments . . . . occasional appeals to the people would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision for that
purpose.”).
6
See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 498
(2010) (lauding such separations as ways of enhancing legality and rights); accord Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal
Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
7
Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2323 (2006).
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rarely will these interests “strongly correlate[] with increasing the scope or wealth of government
institutions.”8 The result is that partisan and ideological loyalty often overrides institutional
loyalty, leaving the American constitutional system at occasional but substantial risk of
institutional imbalance.9 Madison’s envisaged institutional loyalties are therefore minimal in
scope and notional in effect.
The ascendancy of this important and insightful body of work means that the idea of
distinctively institutional loyalties receives short shrift in the constitutional law literature. This
“modern” position typically downplays institutional loyalties because intense partisan and
ideological loyalties have crowded them out. In consequence, little attention is given to
descriptive questions of why these loyalties persist and why they matter (whether for good or ill),
as well as the normative question of how to generate appropriate institutional loyalties when they
are desirable.10 It is against this backdrop that we aim to re-establish institutional loyalty—the
psychological cornerstone of a larger Madisonian political logic—as an object of serious analysis
in constitutional scholars. In the service of that larger project, we advance here three points—one
descriptive, one analytic, and finally a normative claim.
First, as a descriptive matter, we reject the increasingly dominant idea that the behavior
of federal officials can be fully explained by partisan or ideological motives, and the concomitant
assumption (typically implicit) that institutional loyalties can be largely ignored. Look closely
enough and it becomes clear that the current working of our constitutional system evinces the
lingering influence of institutional loyalty of the kind Madison anticipated. Officials may
variously support and increase or a decrease in the power of their institution, but often enough be
motivated by a loyalty to the best interests of their institution. We do not claim, to be clear, that
such loyalties are the most important or consequential element of our constitutional system—
8

Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 920 (2005)
[hereinafter “Levinson, Empire-Building”]; see also Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States:
International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1832 (2009) (“Not all of the structural
and political mechanisms Madison envisioned have worked in the ways he anticipated or hoped”); Daryl J.
Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 670
(2011) (“Madison never explained why the branches of government, or the state and federal governments, would
reliably have political incentives at odds with one another—why they would tend to compete rather than cooperate
or collude.”) [hereinafter Levinson, Parchment].
9
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 411, 443 (2012) (“[T] he Madisonian model of interbranch rivalry is especially inaccurate during times of
unified government.”); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 7, at 2329 (“[W]hen government is unified and the engine of
party competition is removed from the internal structure of government, we should expect interbranch competition
to dissipate. Intraparty cooperation (as a strategy of interparty competition) smoothes over branch boundaries and
suppresses the central dynamic assumed in the Madisonian model.”).
10
The scholars that have remained loyal to institutional loyalty are therefore often left playing defense against the
skeptical modern position that institutional loyalties are relics of our constitutional past. Compare Josh Chafetz,
Congress's Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 774 (2012) (“Congress has significantly more constitutional power
than we are accustomed to seeing it exercise …. A … possible explanation for congressional underutilization of its
powers is that members of Congress are largely unconcerned with congressional power; their primary loyalty is to
their party, not their branch.”); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of
the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 227 (2016) (“[L]eading accounts … fail to capture
the multidimensional nature of administrative control in which the constitutional branches and the administrative
rivals all compete with one another to influence administrative governance.”). Our aim here is to systematize these
hints.
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rather, that they persist to an extent that is underappreciated in current scholarly work. Our aim
here is not to measure their pervasiveness: It is to show that they operate at least occasionally in
important policy consequence—and as such are worth identifying, defining, and exploring in
terms of the institutional design of our constitutional system.
Consider three recent examples, each drawn from a different branch, and each difficult to
explain exclusively by partisan or ideological motivations:
•

Faced with a politically polarizing challenge in a presidential election year to President
Barack Obama’s signature healthcare legislation, Chief Justice John Roberts is alleged to
have shifted his vote to support the legislation.11 Glossing his switch, journalist Jan Crawford
Roberts observed that the Chief Justice “is keenly aware of his leadership role on the court,
and he also is sensitive to how the court is perceived by the public.”12 Standard ideological or
attitudinal models of judicial behavior do not offer a straightforward explanation of his vote,
or his alleged shift.13

•

During the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, many lawyers serving as
cabinet officials and senior political appointees resisted White House initiatives in favor of
positions motivated by allegiance to their agencies’ or office’s legalistic institutional agenda.
Hence, Attorney General John Ashcroft and his deputy James Comey, for example, resisted
White House pressure to authorize a surveillance program they believed ultra vires.14
Similarly, senior lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and the Department of
Defense resisted President Obama’s 2011 military intervention in Libya on legalistic
grounds, while State Department lawyers defended it.15 Despite the different administrations
involved, these examples show officials resisting ideological or partisan ambitions on
legalistic grounds when their home agency or department has an interest in maintaining a
legal constraint on the presidential agenda. Generalizing about these lawyers’ actions, former
OLC lawyer Jack Goldsmith has explained, “[a] political appointee is a temporary steward in
the institution in which she works, and is often moved to preserve the values and reputation
of that institution,” even at the cost of compromising an administration’s immediate policy
goals.16

•

Congress has created a number of durable institutional structures that are not well explained
in terms of the partisan or ideological interests of members. Foremost among these is the

11

Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/.
12
Id.
13
See Jan Crawford, Discord at Supreme Court is Deep, and Personal, CBS NEWS (July 8, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57468202/discord-at-supreme-court-is-deep-and-personal/.
14
See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of
U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 216 (2007) (statement of James B.
Comey, former Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice), http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110shrg35800/pdf/CHRG-110shrg35800.pdf.
15
See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html.
16
Jack Goldsmith, Lawyerly Integrity in the Trump Administration, LAWFARE, May 14, 2017,
https://lawfareblog.com/lawyerly-integrity-trump-administration
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Legislative Reorganization Act (“LRA”) of 1946.17 This Act “vigorously reasserted
congressional oversight power over the Executive Branch, and it remains the statutory basis
for a great deal of contemporary oversight activity.”18 It reorganized the unwieldy
congressional committee system, reducing the number of committees from forty-eight to
nineteen in the House and thirty-three to fifteen in the Senate. In addition, it defined
committee jurisdictions in clear and systematic ways that allowed legislators to specialize in
the oversight of specific elements of the executive. Congressional supervision of the
administrative state of the kind familiar today would simply not exist without the LRA. The
leading historical accounts of the LRA’s legislative passage emphasize that Congress
intended to bolster its institutional capacity to act.19 More generally, Eric Schickler’s study of
every major institutional design change within Congress over the past century found “several
major reforms,” including the LRA, were motivated in important part by “Congress-centered
interests,” rather than by partisan or personal careerist interests alone.20
The official action at stake in each of these three contexts was not only materially significant, but
also hard to explain in purely partisan or ideological terms. Rather, in each case, a pivotal
decision-maker made a costly investment that advanced institutional interests in a way that was
likely at odds with (or at least orthogonal to) the optimal pursuit of partisan or ideological
goals.21 These actions are at least suggestive evidence of the continuing salience of institutional
loyalty across the federal government. They do not imply that institutional loyalty matter always,
or even a majority of the time. Rather, the examples suggest that on some key policy questions,
institutional loyalties can influence the shape and nature of federal action.
With this descriptive claim in hand, our second, analytic contribution is to define with
precision the potential mechanisms through which “institutional loyalty” can operate. This
analytic project has several moving parts. To begin with, we define “institutional loyalty” to
mean an individual official actor’s psychological proclivity to perceive his or her proper course
of behavior in terms of, or as incorporating, what he or she perceives to be the best interests of
her home institution, and to behave in accordance with the interests of her home institution.
This includes not only as a loyalty to advance a branch’s interest in the separation-of-powers
context, but also as positive loyalty toward agency- and department-level interests. We then
suggest that the Constitution contains several mechanisms with the potential to generate
institutional loyalty at the branch level. To establish a more complete accounting of relevant
mechanisms, we identify further examples from the agency and legislative design contexts. The
ensuing taxonomy illuminates untapped options for recalibrating institutional loyalties, and
17

Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 832 (1946).
Jonathan G. Pray, Congressional Reporting Requirements: Testing the Limits of the Oversight Power, 76 U.
COLO. L. REV. 297, 304 (2005).
19
See Roger H. Davidson, The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 357, 360 (1990); accord
Karla W. Simon, Congress and Taxes: A Separation of Powers Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1005, 1027 n.81
(1991) (same).
20
ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.
CONGRESS 9 (2001).
21
There are other examples in which institutional interests and partisan motives clearly align. Consider, for example,
the Senate’s refusal to hold hearings on President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, Merrick Garland. Carl Hulse,
Supreme Court Showdown Could Shape Fall Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2016, at A1. We largely discard these
examples because they do not provide unambiguous evidence of institutional loyalty at work.
18
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thereby enabling institutional retrenchment against potentially destabilizing partisan and
ideological forces. We hence conclude that the modern position is right to posit that institutional
loyalty does not emerge naturally or inevitably. We resist, however, the unspoken (if fairly plain)
implication of skeptical modern position that our constitutional system is bereft of mechanisms
to induce and reinforce such loyalties, and that trying to foster such mechanisms is a fruitless
enterprise.22
To demonstrate the potential for institutional redesign, we explore two distinct
mechanisms that constitutional designers can use to elicit, or tamp down upon, institutional
loyalties. First, constitutional designers can manipulate the selection of officials who populate
branches in ways that render them more or less likely to be institutionally minded. There are two
relevant design decisions with such “selection effects.”23 These are rules that govern entrance to
a branch, and rules concerning exit. Scholars have previously explored selection rules’ use to
promote a range of other constitutional goals, such as democratic accountability, transparency,
and the minimization of democratic agency costs.24 But their underappreciated effect on
institutional loyalty, we submit, rewards renewed attention.
Our second design margin hones in upon the effect of organizational socialization on
officials’ proclivity to align themselves with an institutional mission.25 The three branches of the
federal government are surrounded by a “thick political surround” of internal and external
entities and interest-groups.26 Against that backdrop, constitutional designers can advance or
limit branch-level incentives by fostering an institutional mandate that ousts attachments to
competing elements of the thick political surround, and thereby provides a crisper focal point for
institutional loyalty. We explore the many ways in which a constitutional designer (or a
legislator) can ‘slice up’ institutions of government in order to induce beliefs in a mandate.
Alternatively, designers can harness, or even create, social networks to strengthen or undermine
institutional loyalty. These networks, which emerge within and also cut across branches, are
often ignored because of their informal, unstructured operation. But they too importantly
promote (or undermine) ideological and partisan interests that compete with institutional loyalty.

22

See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 7, at 2318 (“Madison's will-based theory of separation of powers would seem
to require government officials who care more about the intrinsic interests of their departments than their personal
interests or the interests of the citizens they represent. Democratic politics is unlikely to generate such officials.”).
23
Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA. L. REV. 953, 953-54 (2005) (using the term, and
noting that such effects flow “the question of which (potential) officials are selected to occupy those posts over
time”).
24
Constitutions are typically shaped by a range of goals, including the creation of channels for peaceful political
contestation, the enabling of public-good creation, the fostering of legitimacy (democratic or otherwise), and the
minimizing of agency costs. Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq, Introduction, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL
PERFORMANCE 14-23 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq, eds. 2016) (setting out four criteria for the evaluation of a
constitution’s success). The same sort of ends-related pluralism characterizes the separation of powers. Aziz Z. Huq
& Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J 346, 382-91 (2016).
25
Daniel Carpenter & George A. Krause, Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics, 25 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 5, 13 (2014); see also JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE:
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 3 (1999) (summarizing historical research that shows the
influence of “the bureaucrat’s own preferences, peer bureaucrats, supervisors, and the bureaucrat’s clients” on
agency work decisions).
26
Huq & Michaels, supra note 24, at 391.
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Finally, in addition to these descriptive and analytic points, we aim to make a distinct
normative contribution. We argue that constitutional designers of all persuasions should take
account of institutional loyalty as part of their efforts to design a desirable separation of powers.
In our view, institutional loyalties are not in and of themselves intrinsically desirable ends.
Rather, they do play a foundational role in sometimes helping, and sometimes hindering, the
realization of otherwise normatively desirable constitutional ends. Pace Madison, institutional
loyalties are not an end in themselves. They should not be treated as such.
Nevertheless, because institutional loyalties play a pivotal role in shaping how
constitutional law operates at times, the situations in which these loyalties promote desirable
constitutional goals ought to be considered and embraced. In contrast, when loyalties undermine
those goals, they should be avoided. The task of the institutional designer is accordingly
complex: It is to calibrate the appropriate mix of such loyalties across the branches by estimating
when they will advance needful constitutional ends, and when they will retard them. Of
necessity, this task requires some estimation and informed prediction. It is not one that can be
executed with mathematical precision given the unpredictable vagaries of national political life.
But this does not distinguish it from most other elements of constitutional and institutional
design, which must be accomplished in the teeth of substantial uncertainty about the future.
Our reckoning of institutional loyalties, in sum, is more nuanced than Madison’s, even if
we also resist the most extreme implications of the modern position. Consistent with this subtler
approach, we aim here to identify conditions under which institutional loyalty might motivate
constitutional compliance, counteract disabling partisan polarization, and dampen the agency
costs of representative democracy. We think the institutional loyalty should be cultivated to these
ends. On the other hand, we flag instances in which such loyalty undermine the rule of law,
thwart the vindication of constitutional rights, and destabilize the deliberative, polyarchic27 form
of governance sought by the Framers. We think institutional loyalty in the latter cases should be
titrated with greater caution.
In terms of specific reforms, we suggest that useful institutional reform efforts focus now
on increasing institutional loyalty within the legislature while diminishing it within the judiciary.
The executive branch presents a subtler question. In some contexts, the executive is powerfully
motivated by institutional loyalty in ways that redound to the public good. This may especially
be so when elected actors press agendas that are directly disruptive of longstanding democratic
or institutional practice. But in other regards, there is a case for diluting their effects in ways that
protect the rule of law from potentially corrupting and distorting influences.
Our focus on these inter-branch relations means we must sideline the related but distinct
question of federalism as a cockpit in which institutional loyalty also plays a potentially salient
function. The question whether state officials who advance the institutional interests of states

27

ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 8 (1971) (describing polyarchies as “regimes
that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public
contestation”).
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when lobbying Congress,28 participating in cooperative federalism programs,29 contributing to
administrative agency rule-making,30 or advancing structural constitutional arguments in the
Supreme Court is an important and fascinating one. We hope our analysis shows the utility of an
institutional loyalty-focused framing. Perhaps this lens is especially useful at a time not merely
individual fidelities to institutions, but even the stable and predictable operation of national
institutions themselves, appear to be subject to pressure of sorts from populist political
movements on all sides seeking to disrupt the institutional status quo.31
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the conceptual groundwork by defining
and historicizing the concept of institutional loyalty. We demonstrate the past and present
importance of institutional loyalty as both a compliment to and substitute for other mechanisms
to safeguard the separation of powers. Part II then introduces a typology of four mechanisms
whereby institutional loyalty can be cultivated. For each pathway, we carefully examine
necessary assumptions and prerequisites. In Part III, working across all three branches, we
consider the extent to which institutional loyalty is adequate or alternatively excessive for each
of the three branches. We further adduce suggested reforms for strengthening or rechanneling
institutional loyalty based on the insights gained through Part II’s typology.
I.

Institutional Loyalties (and their Critics)

We begin our analysis by clarifying the idea of institutional loyalty. We first offer a
definition of the concept. We then trace its historical and contemporary importance to
constitutional law. While the idea has deep roots and foundational importance to constitutional
law, prevailing legal scholarship is largely hostile to the concept. We then develop a range of
motivating examples to demonstrate the continued prevalence of institutional loyalty.
A.

Defining Institutional Loyalties

An institutional loyalty is an individual official actor’s psychological proclivity to
perceive his or her proper course of behavior in terms of, or as incorporating, what he or she
perceives to be the best interests of her home institution, and to behave in accordance with the
interests of her home institution. To have an institutional loyalty is thus to maintain a stable
28

Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 280-88
(2014) (analyzing difficulties states’ officials have in advancing state interests in Congress, and suggesting
generalizations about when that might occur).
29
Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 28 (2011) (noting that “state agents negotiate with federal
policymakers just like any other lobby to protect their interests during federal lawmaking,” including in the
cooperative federalism context).
30
Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953, 961 (2014) (arguing
that “state interest groups' advocacy efforts were initiated to create a voice for states qua states—a voice for the
institutional interests of state governments rather than the varied political preferences of state constituents or
individual state officials”); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 526
(2012) (describing a “robust, emergent debate of the comparative institutional competencies among Congress,
courts, and agencies in resolving the statutory interpretation, federalism, and regulatory policy issues that are
embedded in preemption disputes”).
31
For more extended consideration of the interaction of populism with constitutional democracy in the U.S. context,
see Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. -- (forthcoming
2018); Aziz Z. Huq, The People against the Constitution, 116 MICH. L. REV. – (forthcoming 2018).
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conception of how best an institution’s mandate—the core purposes or functions it aims to
achieve—can be promoted and to act in accordance with that conception. Competing loyalties
arise, of course, but loyalty to the institution helps ensure that behavior consistent with the
interests of the institution persists in face of this competition.
While the idea of an institutional loyalty has fallen out of current constitutional
jurisprudence, it is a familiar one from our daily lives. Most of us belong to a team, a religious or
civic institution, an organized association, (or even a law school). We necessarily decide when
and whether to align our individual sentiments with the apparent needs of the institutions to
which we affiliate. Within such institutional contexts, it is common to observe that some
individuals identify and behave more consistently with the institution’s shared interests, while
others hue to a more narrowly defined individual conception of self-interest.
Institutional loyalty is also familiar to scholars outside of constitutional law. Within the
rational choice tradition, institutional allegiances are evaluated in terms of the costs and benefits
to individuals of participation in a group. The central collective-action problem that interest
groups face, most famously identified by Mancur Olson, turns on the incentives that individuals
face to act in their own interests and thereby “free ride” on and undermine their institution.32
Following Olsen, public choice scholars have written extensively about the conditions in which
institutional loyalties arise and overcome individual incentives to free ride.33 But in so doing,
political scientists have departed somewhat from the standard motivational premises of rational
choice theory. Some, in a tenor that is relevant to our project here, have contended that
institutions are often constructed to have “purposes” and be “carriers of ideas,” such that their
“norms and values affect their members” to act on behalf of their institutions.34
An institutional loyalty rests, whether explicitly or implicitly, on a contestable judgment
about how to conceptualize a branch’s best interests. This is a matter on which reasonable people
may well disagree. The right way to be loyal, say to Congress or the executive, cannot be
identified mechanically ex ante. Institutional loyalists may therefore disagree about the precise
demands imposed by their fidelity. That said, we think that institutional loyalty is often
characterized by long time-horizons. Given the durability of the branches, their interests are
more likely to be understood in a larger rather than a shorter time frame. In contrast, the
ideological and partisan loyalty identified by the modern position may evince a wider variety of
time horizons, ranging from brief to long.
32
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Institutional loyalty exists in two subtly different forms, but both yield similar behavioral
effects. First, an individual official can perceive an institution’s interests as her interests: There is
no gap between individual sentiment and institutional loyalty. An institutional loyalty, in other
words, can be sincere.35 Alternatively, an individual official might disagree in whole or in part
with the institution’s goals, but nonetheless decide to treat the institution’s interests as her own.
She might do so for strategic reasons (e.g., career advancement) or because of a sense of role
morality.36 For the purposes of our analysis, we largely lump together sincere and strategic forms
of allegiance.
Institutional loyalty is not necessarily identical to what Daryl Levinson has called
“empire-building government.”37 Consider again our threshold examples concerning Chief
Justice Roberts and the executive-branch lawyers in OLC.38 In both, there is evidence that
institutional loyalty was at work, and that loyalty yielded careful thought about how best to
advance an institution’s interests. Both Roberts and the executive-branch lawyers advanced an
institutional agenda by trimming their home institution’s powers. To Roberts, it was (arguably)
obvious that avoiding some divisive rulings would bolster the Article III judiciary’s reputation.
To the executive-branch lawyers, it was obvious that their home department would be
strengthened in the long term by advancing more limited legal claims (and hence perhaps a
means of credible commitment that would reduce congressional resistance to delegation and
judicial skepticism of executive action). On both points, Roberts and the lawyers might have
been wrong as a matter of fact: Their chosen actions might have weakened their respective
branches in unforeseen ways. Or they might have been wrong as a normative matter: The ‘best’
way for an institution—be it a branch, a business, a family, or a nation—to prosper is rarely
beyond dispute. But the complexity and nuance of their judgments suggest that institutional
loyalty need not be “empire-building” in character.39
B.

Historicizing Institutional Loyalties

Institutional autonomy is an important goal of American constitutional design.
Democratic control over institutions has long been an important mechanism to generate this
autonomy. Democratic control, though, can often be insufficient to protect institutions. From the
Framers’ vantage point, ensuring that those working for institutions are loyal to these institutions
was an important compliment to democratic control and a necessary foundation for institutional
autonomy.
The idea of institutional loyalty enters American constitutional law in James Madison’s
account of the separation of powers in Federalist No. 51.40 The question of what would preserve
institutional boundaries between the three branches was pressed actively in the constitutional
35

Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 992 (2008) (defining sincerity in a similar
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W. Bradley Wendel, Professional Roles and Moral Agency, 89 GEO. L.J. 667, 673 (2001) (discussing role
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37
Levinson, Empire-Building, supra note 8, at 928-32.
38
See supra text accompanying notes 11 to 13.
39
Levinson, Empire-Building, supra note 8, at 928.
40
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319-20 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick, ed., 1987).
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ratification debates. Anti-Federalist critics of the 1787 Constitution were alarmed by what they
perceived as deficiencies in the Constitution’s separations between powers.41 Many, such as the
pseudonymous Pennsylvania Officer in the Late Continental Army, worried that the 1787
proposal had simply “not kept separate” different governmental powers.42 A related concern was
that institutional barriers would not prove stable. The Philadelphia-based anti-Federalist
Centinel, for example, doubted the viability of “three balancing powers [i.e., branches], whose
repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium of interests.”43
The most celebrated response to these arguments is found in a series of essays, beginning
with Federalist No. 47, in which James Madison, writing pseudonymously as Publius, defended
the proposed “constitutional equilibrium” between the three branches.44 Madison argued that
“dependence on the people” would be the “primary control on the government.”45 Madison
turned to Thomas Jefferson’s proposal of popular enforcement of separation-of-powers
constraints via periodic constitutional conventions tasked with resolving interbranch
contentions.46
But such popular control, Madison explained, would be inadequate for several reasons.
To begin with, frequent conventions would imply “defects[s]” in government, sapping the
“veneration which time bestows on everything.”47 Madison also worried that partisan “passions”
would cloud popular judgment about the importance of institutional boundaries.48 Even when
popular judgment recognized these boundaries’ value, the people might be handicapped because
they lacked information about what their agents were doing.49 To be sure, Madison thought that
what the government does “ought to be marked out and kept open,”50 but he also knew that the
aspiration toward transparency would on occasion be thwarted.51
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HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 54 (1981).
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for the purpose’”) (emphasis added).
47
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Id. at 315.
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These concerns were grave enough, Madison thought, to make a “necessity
of auxiliary precautions.”52 If “better motives”53 protecting institutional boundaries would not
always be found among the people, they could be supplied via the mechanism of institutional
loyalty. Federalist 51 introduces the concept in a famous passage:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be
connected with the constitutional rights of the place…. This policy of supplying,
by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced
through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it
particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that
each may be a check on the other—that the private interest of every individual
may be a sentinel over the public rights.54
Madison’s argument has several elements, which can be usefully disaggregated: (1) the
alignment between officials’ and offices’ interests (which we label institutional loyalty); (2) that
will be “opposite and rival” to each other; (3) so as to shield public rights and stabilize a
“constitutional equilibrium.” We are interested here in the first element. This element, we note, is
conceptually distinct from the other pieces of Madison’s argument.
In Madison’s account, institutional loyalty plays the part that “self-love” has in Adam
Smith’s famous economic theory, a private vice that can be set in dynamic interaction against
itself to promote the public good.55 Institutional loyalties lead officials to “resist encroachments
of the other[]” branches.56 Official loyalty to one’s institution means that their resistance does
not fluctuate along with popular “passions.”57 In this sense, institutional loyalty compliments
democratic control as a mechanism to protect branch-level boundaries, especially at moments
when passions sweep the populace.
Madison limns three paths by which this mechanism has an effect. First, institutions can
operate as “a check on [each] other.”58 If the executive branch is generating “encroachments” on
Congress, for example, officials loyal to the legislative branch expend time and effort to “resist”
the executive. Second, Madison also thought a third-party (such as a federal court, or perhaps the
several states) might identify and “resist encroachments.”59 The legislative branch can resist the
executive branch by initiating or organizing challenges the executive branch in federal court, for
52
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advantage to do for him what he requires of them....”). On Madison’s reading of Smith, see Samuel Fleischacker,
Adam Smith's Reception Among the American Founders, 1776-1790, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 897, 905-15 (2002);
David Prindle, The Invisible Hand of James Madison, 15 CONST. POL. ECON. 223, 231-34 (2004).
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instance. Third, those within an institution have a comparative advantage in identifying and
resisting encroachments on their authority.60
Writing as Publius, Madison and Hamilton both expressed their expectation that
institutional loyalties would generate good government. Addressing the Senate’s willingness to
punish executive-branch wrong-doing through the impeachment process, Hamilton in Federalist
No. 66 hence avers to that chamber’s “pride, if not … [its] virtue” as a spring of action.61 And
discussing relations between the national government and the several states, Madison
hypothesized “motives on the part of the State governments to augment their prerogatives,” and
conjectured that even officials elected to federal office would have “prepossessions …
generally… favorable to the states.”62 These inclinations, he suggested, would be so strong that
even if the national government had “an equal loyalty with the State governments to extend its
power beyond the due limits,” the latter were likely to “have the advantage.63
There is also a trace of an institutional loyalty-based argument in Alexander Hamilton’s
defense of the federal judiciary in Federalist No. 78.64 On Hamilton’s account, members of the
federal judiciary would be steeped in a dense network of “strict rules and precedents,”65 which
require hard study to master. Judges’ behavior, Hamilton argued, would be oriented and shaped
by organizational socialization on the branch. By analogy to then-contemporary models of
human psychology, Hamilton supposed that the legalistic loyalty inculcated in Article III judges
would orient the latter toward acting as the “conscience” of the federal government.66 It requires
only a small step to hypothesize on this basis that judges’ guild loyalty will lead them to value
and protect their branch’s distinctive institutional culture and role.
In developing this Madisonian vision, we think it is important to observe that institutional
loyalty, while a crucial design dimension of constitutional law, is also a normatively complicated
one. Institutional loyalty is not identical to constitutional loyalty. An institution’s best interests
can be served by behaviors not contemplated or allowed by constitutional law. Moreover, the
boundaries of an institution are already sufficiently robust that officials’ zeal and loyalty can
disserve the stability of the constitutional system.
But this gap between institutional and constitutional loyalty is left largely unaddressed by
Madison and his contemporaries. The Federalist Papers separately address institutional loyalty
(in places like Federalist 51) and constitutional loyalty. Hamilton, for instance, defended the
Electoral College in Federalist No. 68 as a means of ensuring loyalty to constitutional principle
60
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given its tendency to select for “characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue,” and not those with
a talent for “the little arts of popularity.”67 He did not connect this theory (however sound it
might be in practice) to his accounts of institutional loyalties, or to the Madisonian vision of
ambition checking ambition. Nor does Publius ever explain why a national representative
process that generates officials inclined to pursue “common good of the society”68 would also
throw up institutionally disposed officials. In short, even when reconstructed with a friendly eye,
the Madisonian account of institutional loyalties is characterized by gaps and discontinuities with
the balance of Publius’s theory of constitutional design.
This understanding of official motivation has not fallen completely out of the
jurisprudence. In construing the Federal Vacancies Reform Act69 in NLRB v. S.W. General, for
example, Chief Justice Roberts explained Congress’s decision to alter that statutory scheme in
1998 as motivated by a “[p]erceiv[ed] threat to the Senate's advice and consent power.”70 At least
in the Court’s view, therefore, it is still sensible to gloss congressional action in terms of the
durable institutional prerogatives and powers of Article I institutions. In a similar vein, the
District of Columbia courts have recognized that when Congress as “[an] institution … files suit,
it can obtain a remedy for the ‘institutional’ injury.”71 The recognition for Article III standing
purposes of a legislature’s ability to vindicate “institutional” interests by seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief is a formal legal recognition of the idea that the officials within one of the three
branches can and do act on the basis of institutional, rather than ideological or partisan,
grounds.72
C.

Questioning Institutional Loyalties

Legal scholarship tells a different story about institutional loyalties. Dominant voices in
the law reviews question whether officials really are or could be disposed often to act in
accordance with their branch’s interests. They appear to be skeptical that institutional loyalties
even exist, and scorn the idea that they might be sufficiently reliable and regular to explain
institutional behavior.73 To be clear, few scholars reject the bare possibility of an institutional
loyalty. It is rather that the latter concept plays no meaningful role in their account of
67
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constitutional actors. Resistance to institutional loyalty is complemented by an embrace of an
alternative strain of fidelities—partisan and ideological, in the main—that are believed to be
more significantly, and more acutely motivating, than institutional loyalty. Behavior might be
consistent with institutional loyalty, on this view, but is never caused by them. We term this
skeptical approach the “modern position” on institutional loyalty. We set forth this skeptical
story in general terms, and then consider its roots. This serves as a prelude to Parts II and III,
which demonstrate (contra the modern position) that institutional loyalty not only exist, but can
be analyzed in parsimonious and rigorous terms as part of constitutional law. Hence, while we
admire much of the scholarship that comprises the modern position, we think its most ambitious
variants sweep too far. We offer a modest course correction here.
The modern position is based on three interrelated descriptive claims about other
affiliations that crowd out institutional loyalties. First, scholars argue that partisan loyalties
overwhelm any institutional loyalties and lead officials to act inconsistently with institutional
interests.74 Officials rely on parties to win elections for Congress or the White House, and to
secure political appointments to the executive branch and the federal bench; they subsequently
maintain their fealty to their partisan patrons.75 Officials also rely on parties to exercise
significant powers while in office, and pursue partisan agendas when interacting with other
governmental bodies.76 As a result of these observed regularities, “realist claims about legal
indeterminancy and the relation of law and politics are widely accepted in the academy.”77 To
those who subscribe to the overwhelming power of partisan loyalty, it is a historical irony that
Madison and his contemporaries (many of whom would go on to create national parties) did not
realize that political parties would exist and would generate such powerful incentives that can in
practice counteract institutional loyalty.78
Second, scholars contend that ideological allegiances conflict with and overwhelm
institutional loyalties. An official’s underlying sentiment about policy motivates their behavior,
even when in conflict with institutional interests.79 This assumption dominates political-science
74
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models of judicial behavior.80 It is commonplace in that literature to assert “the Supreme Court
decides disputes in light … the ideological attitudes and values of the judges…. Rehnquist votes
the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he
[was] extremely liberal.”81 While measures of ideology have become more nuanced of late,
many hew to the belief that the ideological loyalty of the Justices motivate decisions, not their
loyalty towards the Court qua institution. Building on this attitudinal model, positive political
theorists have observed that even ideologically motivated judges must account for the likely
strategic responses to their interventions, and tailor their actions accordingly.82 While such
models yield more nuanced predictions, they are characterized by the same a priori rejection of
institutional loyalty.83
Ideological loyalty is correlated with, but not identical to, partisan loyalty. Being
motivated by a belief about what furthers a policy goal is different from being motivated by a
belief about what serves a political organization. Presidents of one party sometimes, either on
purpose84 or as an unintentional side-effect of another goal, nominate an official with a differing
ideological perspective, in some instances “using the agent's known enmity to the principal's
benefit.”85 For example, presidents might nominate judges with different ideological preferences
from their own as a way of credibly signaling the judge’s competence, or alternatively in order to
impose costs on the partisan opposition. President Obama’s 2016 nomination of the eminent
moderate jurist Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, we think, has this flavor. At other
instances, partisan affiliation may simply be a bad proxy for ideological preferences. President
Dwight Eisenhower, for instance, nominated Justice William Brennan and Chief Justice Earl
Warren to the Supreme Court.86 Famously, he later expressed regret about their liberal tilt.87 As
the two major political parties have become increasingly ideologically homogeneous and
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polarized, though, party and ideology have become strongly correlated.88 Indeed, a positive
loyalty towards a party can generate specific and predictable loyalty towards certain policies.89
In addition, it is worth noting that it is quite possible for a partisan or an ideological
loyalty to bleed into an institutional loyalty. An ideological commitment to certain policy goals
may conduce to a belief in the primacy of one particular branch; for instance, a strong concern
with national security might conduce to a preference for executive-branch primacy.90 In such
instances, the line between ideological and institutional loyalties may be blurred. But the
existence of ambiguous cases at the margin does not rob these categories of their utility as a
general matter.
Third, the modern position argues that personal, materialistic loyalties conflict with and
overwhelm institutional loyalties.91 A loyalty to maximize power (in current office or by seeking
a higher one) could conflict with institutional loyalty. A desire for the immediate or longitudinal
acquisition of wealth could also conflict with institutional loyalty. The federal criminal offense
of honest services fraud, which penalizes naked self-dealing in the performance of “official
act[s],” 92 is one mechanism for mitigating such conflicts. The recent Supreme Court decision in
McDonnell v. United States narrowly construed that prohibition, effectively allowing personal
pecuniary interests greater leeway to displace both ideological and institutional concerns.93
The modern position supplements these arguments by insisting on the impossibility of
defining institutional powers. Madison might have been a theorist of institutional loyalty, but he
famously wrote that “no skill in the science of government has yet been able to . . . define, with
sufficient certainty, [government’s] three great provinces—the legislative, executive and
judiciary.”94 Legal scholars have likewise argued that defining what it would mean to protect
“Congress” is a difficult enterprise.95 Absent a cogent account of institutional perimeters, it is
assumed, there is no way to maintain a loyalty toward an institution.
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Legal scholars articulating the modern position hence construct an account of
governmental behavior in which there is little or no room for institutional loyalty. When a
President disagrees with large numbers of their partisan or ideological allies in the Congress,
they are not only reluctant to ascribe this to a favorable loyalty towards the executive branch, but
instead offer the alternative explanation that it could “reflect[] the divergent preferences of the
different temporal and geographical majorities that the House, Senate, and President represent
(as opposed to the institutional interests of the branches as such).”96 Scholars writing about the
persistence and predictability of institutional loyalties are therefore left playing defense, having
to discount possible alternative loyalties that could explain a behavior that appears to be based on
an institutional loyalty.
Official claims on behalf of institutional interests may also be discounted as a form of
“cheap talk.” The modern position is that such claims are ex post rationalizations, not ex ante
loyalty. Publicly asserting an alternative loyalty instead of an institutional one—would be
politically disastrous.97 For example, consider the congressional reaction to the Supreme Court’s
affirming a Fifth Circuit’s opinion that had earlier invalidated President Obama’s immigration
deferred action programs,98 Republican Speaker Paul Ryan issued a widely-noted statement
proclaiming his institutional loyalty. Speaker Ryan said that he supported the lawsuit to ensure
that “Article I of the Constitution was vindicated” and that his success was a “major victory in
our fight to restore the separation of powers.”99 The modern position is that Speaker Ryan talked
a good institutional game, but had a distinct and different underlying loyalty. As one of the major
national leaders of the Republican Party, his partisan loyalty led him to challenge the actions of a
President of the other party. As an ideologically conservative elected official, he did not believe
in creating a legal status for undocumented immigrants. As an ambitious young politician,
placing himself in front of a major national issue promised more power and prominence. Taking
Ryan as a modal actor in the constitutional system, it is a short step to a general rejection of the
possibility of an institutional loyalty.
In short, the modern view of the motivations of institutional actors within our separation
of powers has little or no space for institutional loyalties. By contrast, our claim is not that the
scholars we have cited reject as a categorical matter the possibility of such fidelities. Rather, in
their accounts of institutional behavior and motivations, they leave scant room for the concept. It
is this lacuna in the literature that we aim to explore here.
D.

Identifying Institutional Loyalties

Institutional loyalty can be observed among contemporary officials in all three branches.
Although we can identify instances of institutional loyalty in quite disparate circumstances, we
make no claim here about their relative frequency in comparison to other motivations (e.g.,
partisan, ideological, etc.). More modestly, we think institutional loyalty is not a marginal
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phenomenon. It has played meaningful roles in many important constitutional law disputes. We
offer a range of illustrations drawn from each of the three branches, extending our discussion in
the Introduction.100 We err on the side of numerosity given that the idea of institutional loyalty—
for reasons explored at the end of this Part.
1.

The Executive Branch

We begin by offering instances of institutional loyalty at work within the executive. We
start with high-profile post-9/11 claims of executive authority in the Bush Administration. We
then turn to equally controversial debates about executive authority in the foreign-policy area
during the Obama Administration.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Bush White Office articulated a
“conceded[ly] aggressive” view of executive authority that would have preempted or narrowed
congressional directives on military deployment, detention, torture, and electronic
surveillance.101 Other policy paths of less resistance existed, but were rejected because of a
loyalty to a particular constitutional role for the executive. Many (but not all) of the policies
pursued under this Article II flag could have been supported by “creative… perhaps even
tendentious” interpretations of federal statutes.102 Republicans controlled the House until 2007,
and the Senate after 2002, and would have supported new statutes authorizing much of what the
Bush Administration argued that Article II granted it the power to do.103
But members of the Bush Administration, and in particular Vice-President Richard
Cheney, offered a different account. On their view, decisions were motivated by a personal
commitment to establishing an expansive constitutional role of the executive, which in their view
had been unduly cabined since the 1970s.104 In their own words, President Bush and VicePresident Cheney had a long-standing desire “to leave the presidency stronger than they found
it.”105 This assertion of this view of executive authority nevertheless ran the risk of “achiev[ing]
the opposite” by cultivating “a harmful suspicion and mistrust.”106 Vice-President Cheney, at a
minimum, was quite aware that “personal leadership, public education, political support, and
inter-branch comity” all might be determinants of executive power.107 But he nevertheless
advanced Article II grounds, even though they raised unnecessary, costly, and divisive objections
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to immediate policy choices, because they advanced the institutional authority of the
presidency.108
The example of Vice President Cheney is an interesting one for our purposes, since his
fidelity to the executive branch was evident both when he sat in the White House and also while
he was a member of the House of Representatives. It is worth remembering that Cheney started
his career in the White House, as an assistant to Donald Rumsfeld in the Office of Economic
Opportunity in 1969-70. He rose to the position of White House chief of staff for President
Gerald Ford before he ever set foot in Congress.109 It is consistent with our view of institutional
loyalties that Cheney seems to have formulated strong views about the executive branch as an
employee of the executive branch, and then maintained those views even as he moved to a
different branch of government. Hence, the fact that Representative Cheney held the same views
as Chief of State Cheney and Vice-President Cheney does not undermine our claim—rather, it
shows the potential for institutional loyalties to stick notwithstanding transitions between
different branches of government. Of course, this need not always be the case. There are other
famous instances of interbranch transition—think of John Marshall, who served in the House, the
Adams Administration, and on the Court, or Roger Taney—not characterized by the same
tenacity of initial institutional fidelity.
While Vice President Cheney and his colleagues were motivated by an institutional
loyalty to expand the power of the executive branch, cabinet officials and senior political
appointees resisted some of their efforts because of their institutional loyalties. Attorney General
John Ashcroft was a former Republican Governor and Senator who was “controversial because
of his impassioned advocacy of conservative causes.”110 As he lay in an intensive care unit in the
hospital on the night of March 10, 2004, though, Ashcroft summoned the energy to resist White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and Chief of Staff Andrew Card when they asked him to
reauthorize a domestic surveillance program. Ashcroft later testified and wrote that he refused to
sign because he believed the program to legally flawed, and because he believed the White
House to be neglecting the institutional role of the Department of Justice in deciding what is
legal.111
Institutional loyalty, moreover, is not the preserve of one Administration or one party. In
2011, President Obama determined that he did not need congressional authorization under the
War Powers Resolution to continue air strikes in Libya.112 This conclusion was resisted by two
political appointees—Jeh C. Johnson, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and
Caroline D. Krass, the acting head of the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice.
Johnson had been a political appointee during the Clinton Administration, had raised money and
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campaigned for past Democratic presidential nominees,113 and would later serve as Secretary of
Homeland Security for President Obama. Krass had previously served as a special advisor to
President Obama, and would later become his General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency.114 Despite these partisan commitments, though, both Johnson and Krass argued to
President Obama that his legal conclusions were incorrect, and that his “unusual process” of
rejecting OLC and other legal advice from within the executive branch was problematic.115 In so
doing, they reflected an institutional alignment at odds with traditional stories of partisanship and
ideology.116
2.

The Judiciary

Two recent examples highlight the possibility of institutional loyalty among federal
judges. A first high-salience example of a Justice acting against perceived ideological
preferences as a result of what apparently were institutional concerns is, as noted previously,
Chief Justice Roberts’s alleged switch to vote in favor of upholding the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act (“ACA”) in NFIB v. Sebelius.117 Commentators
immediately characterized Roberts’s decision as “a brilliant act of judicial statesmanship” that
shielded the Court, as an institution, from accusation of partisan bias.118 Roberts’s vote, we think,
is hard to explain purely in terms of his known ideological preferences. Consistent with that
view, many conservative commentators subsequently condemned the Chief Justice in no
uncertain terms as an ideological turncoat.119 Although it is not possible to say with certainty
what motivated Roberts, we think that institutional loyalties are plausibly thought to have played
a role.
Similarly, in the wake of Justice Antonin Scalia’s untimely death in 2016, the Chief
Justice, and other Justices, made seemingly concerted efforts to “find consensus wherever
possible,” by avoiding 4-4 splits and reducing the number of disputes in its pipeline.120 In Zubik
v. Burwell, the Justices were asked to decide whether regulations issued pursuant to the Patient
113
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) mandating that employers provide contraception
coverage to women violated the statutory rights of nonprofit religious employers.121 Just two
years earlier, the Court divided five to four in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., about the
related issue of whether the mandate unduly burdened the religious freedoms of for-profit
corporations.122
By the time oral argument transpired on March 23, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia had died,
leaving a likely four to four split on the Court. President Obama had also nominated United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Judge Merrick Garland to replace
Justice Scalia, leading to Republican opposition and placing the Court in the midst of the heated
political debate in a presidential election year yet again. Less than one week after oral argument,
the eight Justices unanimously “issued an unusual order”123 directing the parties to file
supplemental briefs finding a compromise outcome that both sides would find agreeable.124 In
May, the Court issued an unsigned unanimous opinion remanding the case to the lower courts to
find an acceptable compromise order.125
As in the Sebelius case, the Justices appeared to behave in ways inconsistent with their
ideological preferences (i.e., their sincerely held opinions about the substance of the law), and
instead consonant with the interests of the judiciary as an institution. A polarized and deadlocked
Court avoided dividing on ideological or jurisprudential grounds in order to preserve the public
perception of the Court as above and independent of politics. This was certainly the
interpretation of the opinion by many of those who follow the Supreme Court most closely.126
Indeed, Justice Elena Kagan confirmed this interpretation during a subsequent public
appearance.127
3.

Congress

Examples of institutional loyalty influencing the collective action of either Congress or a
single chamber are more difficult to discern than their judicial or executive-branch analogs.
There are many examples, to be sure, of legislative assertions of institutional prerogative as a
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means toward a partisan end. For example, the Senate’s refusal to hold confirmation hearings for
President Obama’s nomination for the Supreme Court vacancy left by Justice Scalia’s sudden
demise sounds in institutional prerogative. Similarly, a recent lawsuit filed by the House of
Representatives challenging expenditures on the Affordable Care Act has resulted in a districtcourt opinion that endorses a legislative power to challenge violations of the Appropriations
Clause.128 But we think both are better understood as partisan initiatives with positive
institutional spillovers: Only with much caution and clearer evidence can they be ranked as clear
evidence of institutional loyalty within Congress.
Better examples of institutional loyalty on Congress’s part focus on costly legislative acts
that have little immediate partisan or electoral payoff, but that have enabled the legislative
branch as a whole to pursue its identified interests in the long-term. That is, when a legislative
action produces little or no certain short-term policy effect, but in the long-term enables
Congress, it is more likely to be explained by institutionally oriented motives.
The leading comparative study of institutional design changes within Congress, by
political scientist Eric Schickler, underscores the plurality of motives that underscore many
legislative acts.129 Notwithstanding that finding, Schickler identifies several instances in which
what we call institutional loyalties were decisive (if not uniquely at play). The first of these is the
Legislative Reorganization Act (“LRA”) of 1946, which “sought to enhance Congress’s position
relative to the executive by strengthening congressional committees and by providing new
integrative devices, such as party policy committees and a centralized budget process, to
coordinate committee activities.”130 As we have noted, the LRA slimmed the number of
committees in both the House and the Senate as a means to empowering more effective
congressional oversight. To that end, it also authorized additional staff to help professionalize
legislators’ offices.131 Congressional debates show that legislators were concerned by the
disjunction between a rapidly expanding executive branch and a Congress that had “relatively
stood still.”132 This “remarkably consistent message from Democrats and Republicans across the
ideological spectrum” about Article I power and “prestige” helped enact a measure that stripped
many members of the perquisites of committee leadership and membership—i.e., that diluted
their personal power without advancing an ideological or partisan goal.133 The LRA’s history is
also striking in that it is characterized by a bipartisan recognition of the positive role that
government plays—in contrast to the relentless attacks on government from Republicans in
particular since the 1980s.
But the 1946 Act is not the only instance of Congress acting in its own defense that
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Schickler identifies. Between 1889 and 1990, he finds that at least seven out of 42 institutional
reforms in Congress were motivated in part by what he calls “Congress or chamber-oriented
interests” as distinct from party interests, policy interests, and reelection-related interests.134 In
addition to the Legislative Reorganization Act, Schickler identifies appropriations and Senate
committee reform in the 1920s, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of 1967, and the
Stevenson committee reforms of 1977 as relevant examples.135 The Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, for instance, was created after World War II as a joint body with members from both the
House and Senate exercising sole jurisdiction, sole power to report relevant legislation, and
important oversight powers over the vital and growing postwar policy question of how to
manage atomic energy.136 Like the LRA, the Joint Committee emerged from a bipartisan
consensus that Congress needed the institutional capacity to keep up with regulatory growth
within the executive.137 In short, the “middle to late twentieth century” was a particularly fruitful
period for such reforms, as Congress endeavored to respond systematically to increasing
executive-branch authority.138
In addition to Schickler’s examples, Josh Chafetz’s recent survey of congressional
powers identifies the creation of the General Accounting Office and the Senate’s defense of its
prerogatives in relation to treaties as instances of legislative self-assertion that are not well
explained by partisan or ideological motives.139 The latter, created in 1920, was intended to
fashion a new accounting department that would be accountable “only to Congress” and that
would give Congress “the very facts that Congress ought to be in possession of.”140 In addition,
we think that the Congressional Budgeting Office, which is tasked with issuing estimates of how
much proposed legislation will cost the federal fisc, as an institutional innovation that reflects
institutional rather than partisan or ideological interests.141
Some scholars, including Schickler, have identified the federal budgeting process as a
“centralizing changing intended to safeguard congressional power.”142 In 1974, provoked by
President Richard Nixon’s aggressive use of impoundment authority, Congress passed the
Congressional Budget Act, which provided a framework for coordinated committee
consideration of expenditures, and a predictable set of mechanisms for legislative deliberation
over the final packet of budget proposals.143 At its heart was the new annual congressional
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budget resolution, which set forth “overall national fiscal policies” at the beginning of the
budgeting process, thereby enabling coordination toward a final appropriations measure.144
Although these new procedures can be glossed as means of empowering Congress as an
institutions, they can also be seek as a mechanism for empowering members of budget
committees while increasing the time in which members could seek pay-offs consistent with
game-theoretic models of self-serving legislative behavior.145 Although Schickler does find
evidence of institutional motives in relation to the 1974 Budget Act, we think the force of
parochial interests may be stronger here than in the other cases mentioned above.
Finally, Adrian Vermeule and Cass Sunstein have recently suggested that the 1946
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) is similarly a historical “compromise” between proregulatory and anti-regulatory forces, which is not “generally and systematically progressive, or
proregulatory, or anything else.”146 If they are correct, the APA should be understood as a farsighted investment in a legal framework that enabled Congress to achieve its shifting regulatory
goals without having to create a basic legal framework from the ground up each time it did so.
Elizabeth Garrett has identified other forms of “framework legislation” that Congress has
enacted and still enforces that could be described in a similar fashion to budgetary legislation or
the APA.147
Although we have assembled examples of institutional loyalty manifesting within
Congress, we do not wish to exaggerate the force of our claim. It may once have been the case
that Congress engaged in robust self-defense of its institutional prerogatives,148 by (among other
things) resisting judicial orders of which it disapproved.149 But it is striking that all of our
examples are relatively removed from the contemporary moment. This suggests that institutional
loyalties have eroded over time as a result of many forces, both within and outside Congress.150
Today, only a pale shadow of their former force may be felt.
*

*

*

Institutional loyalty can be observed motivating recent actions of all three of the
branches. Each of our examples highlights an instance in which loyalty prevailed against
countervailing partisan or ideological concerns. Our examples not only provide evidence of
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institutional loyalty, but also show how the latter does influence officials’ ultimate actions,
notwithstanding partisan or ideological preferences. Because we have selected relatively highprofile examples, we are confident that institutional loyalties cannot be written off as a marginal
phenomenon: They are instead a meaningful element of contemporary separation-of-powers
dynamics.
Our examples, however, leave open the question of why and how the strength of
institutional loyalties has fluctuated over time, and how such changes have interacted with shifts
in partisan and ideological attachment. It seems likely that the core claim of the modern
position—that ideological and partisan loyalties dominate—is itself a contingent historical
artifact of the ebbing strength of institutional loyalties. Indeed, one benefit of bringing to bear the
concept of institutional loyalties to bear is that it casts light on the process of motivational
change within the political elites charged with managing the three branches of government.
For example, rates of both partisan polarization among political elites and party discipline
within Congress have changed markedly over time151 in ways that may have influenced the
strength of institutional loyalties. Polarization, for example, arguably undermines legislators’
willingness to pursue institutional rather than partisan ends as party leadership exercise greater
agenda control in pursuit of distinct and ideologically incompatible agendas.152 On the other
hand, the decline of institutional loyalties—say as a result of increasingly lucrative exit options
for former members of Congress—may have contributed to the growing force of partisan and
ideological preferences. The interaction between partisan/ideological motives and institutional
loyalties provides a motor driving changes to institutional behavior over time. It would thus be a
mistake to describe the motivations of key actors in our constitutional system as static, rather
than as dynamic and evolving over time.
II.

The Sources of Institutional Loyalty

If institutional loyalty is neither impossible nor inevitable, how does it come to be in the
first instance? This Part focuses on the question of how institutional loyalties arise. Our aim here
is to identify, and loosely categorize, the discrete choices made by the designer of a constitution,
or of important national institutions, that make officials either more or less likely to identify with
and seek to promote the goals of their institutional home. We identify two relevant margins of
design. Each can be manipulated in two different ways.
First, we explore the influence of institutional design on the selection of institutional
personnel. Institutional designers have a large measure of control over entrance and exit rules.
The terms of entrance and exit by officials into an institution, therefore, select not only on the
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kind of officials who opt into the institution in the first instance, but also the extent to which they
remain long enough to develop institutional loyalty.153
Second, we posit that officials’ preferences are shaped and regulated by organizational
socialization, and in particular the social context in which they operate. Social context, operating
both within and around an institution, can foster a “durable, transposable loyalty … [that in turn
will] generate and organize practices” by which branches, agencies, and organizations implement
missions.154 We explore two mechanisms through which institutional designers can use
organizational socialization to promote loyalty and identification with an institution. First, the
choice of institutional mandate can influence the extent of such identification. Second, we
explore how institutional designers can harness, and even seed, wider social networks that
surround an institution, generating or reinforcing positive (or negative) loyalty towards an
institution.
All these mechanisms can operate at the level of constitutional design, understood as the
written work-product of the Philadelphia Convention and successive amendment. Because the
1787 Constitution does not comprehensively describe the full institutional landscape of the
federal government, however, it also leaves ample room for legislators and presidents to develop
the “small-c” constitution, which comprises “the fundamental political institutions of a society,
or the constitution in practice.”155 As a result of the Constitution’s incompleteness, many
possible avenues for institutional reform (some identified in Part III) remain open. We hence
sketch here mechanisms that are available both to constitutional drafters and more mundane
administrators of government.
A.

Entrance and Promotion Rules

A first means to elicit institutionally disposed officials is to employ devices for regulating
the threshold choice of official hires in ways that sort the institutionally-minded from those with
self-serving or ideological or partisan motives, and to ensure that only the former are promoted
within the organization.156 Some (but not all) of the design options described in this section
operate through a demand for a “costly” signal. Such measures leverage the insight that when the
cost of a qualification “is negatively correlated with the unseen characteristic that is valuable to
the employers,” it can be used to distinguish ‘good’ types (who easily acquire it) from ‘bad’
types (who do not find it worthwhile getting the qualification).157 In addition to devices that
select for more institutionally-minded candidates, an institutional designer can sculpt criteria for
promotion—i.e., the shape of the job ladder—to select right-minded individuals. We begin by
exploring selection mechanisms in the constitutional context, before using statutory examples to
illustrate other mechanisms not identified or used in the Constitution’s text.
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We have seen that Madison, in Federalist No. 51, asserted that “[t]he interest of the man
[could] be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”158 An examination of the
balance of the Federalist Papers reveals scant attention, however, to the important question how
this connection would be made. In contrast, Publius pays close attention to how selection rules
for the branches conduce to virtuous officials. In Federalist No. 10, most famously, Madison
developed a theory of the “extended republic,” in which the process of representation would
dilute local factions and “refine and enlarge the public views.”159 As we discussed in Part I,
though, virtuous officials are not necessary those with institutional loyalty.
At best, Publius’s argument offers mere hints of how institutional loyalty might be
produced by selection. In Federalist No. 57, Madison suggested that elected officials’ “pride and
vanity [would] attach him to a form of government which favors his pretentions and gives him a
share in its honors and distinctions,”160 perhaps including those of an institutional character.
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 62 glosses the pre-Seventeenth Amendment regime of
state legislative power to appoint Senators not only as a way of “giving to the State governments
… an agency in [the federal government],”161 but also as a means of picking Senators with “due
acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation.”162 The latter phrase might be glossed
(with some difficulty) as an inclination to attend to the rights and interests of a legislating
institution. Finally, Hamilton emphasized in Federalist No. 78 that Article III judges would be
appointed via the same method as principal officers of the executive branch—and also praised
judges for their expected quality of “judgment.”163 Although this again might be read as evidence
of selection for an institutional loyalty, it also suggests an optimistic view of the filtering power
of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.164
We do not think that these hints add up to a complete account of the Constitution’s
selection mechanisms as means for promoting institutional identification. Nor do we think such a
comprehensive theory, explaining how the Constitution selects for both public virtue and
institutional loyalty, can be developed. As Joanne Freeman has explained, it is not obvious that
the Framers’ ideas about Republican virtue can be reconciled entirely with their commitment to
representative democracy.165 Trying to kneed their invocations of public virtue into claims about
institutional loyalty seems even more implausible. As a theorist of institutional loyalty as a
matter of constitutional design, therefore, Publius falls far short.
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Other constitutional designers have done better. In many other jurisdictions, the judiciary
is organized as a form of civil service with lifetime career paths. Career judiciaries rely on costly
signals insofar as they demand that judges renounce potentially lucrative private careers early in
their professional life. By building job ladders within the judiciary, career judiciaries also align
the professional ambitions of judges with the goals of the court system as a whole. In Germany,
for example, the judiciary is a prestigious career choice, open only to those with the “best”
academic credentials in their study in programs dedicated to the law with partisan considerations
playing a “very subordinate” role.166 Promotion depends on meritocratic evaluation by peer
judges, with partisan considerations playing a much lesser role.
The leading American commentator on the German judicial system is unequivocal: Its
career-path attracts the “very best” to the bench, and then assures that “career advancement [is]
congruent with the legitimate interests of the litigants.”167 The German judiciary, in short, selects
for and cultivates an institutional loyalty by orienting its officials toward excellence in the
performance of the institution’s central task—settling disputes fairly. Of course, mere installation
of a career judiciary is no panacea.168 Rather, we flag the German example as evidence that other
constitutional designers have identified ways of eliciting desirable institutional loyalty among
civil servants.
Institutional loyalty might also be cultivated, or diminished, through statutory selection
mechanisms. The modern American civil service has a series of rules that embody both costly
entrance mechanisms and also promotion schemes that entangle individual and institutional
ambitions. Contrary to the standard “starting point in analyzing politicians’ behaviors . . . that
they are socially motivated,”169 careful attention to these schemes shows how extant statutory
frameworks carefully cultivate institutional loyalty.
Starting with the Pendleton Act of 1883, statutory civil-service laws have contained
filtration mechanisms such as competitive entrance exams.170 The current merit hiring process
for the federal civil service requires that career positions are filled based on objective skill and
experience.171 These threshold mechanisms make long-term government service less attractive
for those with strong partisan or pecuniary motives, but lacking in relevant skills or subjectmatter expertise. As a result, these screens narrow the pool of applicants to those most likely to
internalize an institutional loyalty, even if applicants themselves are unlikely to have such loyalty
before taking on a government positions.
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In addition to navigating these screens, professional civil servants must forego the greater
compensation typically available in the private sector when choosing to enter public service.
Lawyers, engineers, scientists, and accountants all earn far less than their counterparts in the
private sector.172 This public/private salary differential has two effects. Like competitive exams,
it again selects against certain types (e.g., those primarily motivated by personal pecuniary
motives). And by ousting high-powered incentives173 it also preserves space for other forms of
motivation. Institutional ambitions and norms are, as a result, far more likely to infuse the
preferences and behavior of officials than would be the case absent the civil service regime’s
constraints on political and pecuniary motives.174
These threshold mechanisms are complemented by a promotion structure that elicits
institutional loyalty even more actively. Promotions depend upon “seniority and the passage of
time, rather than on productivity,” or evidence of skill.175 Partisan and pecuniary motives are
excluded as grounds of official action by the civil service laws. The 1939 Hatch Act ensures that
“employment and advancement in the Government service [does] not depend on political
performance,”176 just as the honest services law rules out self-interested pecuniary motives
among elected officials.177 Legal historian Nicholas Parrillo has charted the demise of profit as a
motivating force within the federal bureaucracy as fees and bounties gradually fell into
desuetude, to be supplanted by fixed, outcome-independent salaries.178 To the extent that salary
competition does occur now, it is channeled through a centralized system of classifications of
different bureaucratic positions for salary purposes—a context in which institutional priorities
are highly influential.179
Finally, once partisan and pecuniary motives are taken off the table, civil servants also
tend to have long careers closely tied to their home institutions. Turnover in federal employment
is low. In each year between 2004 and 2012, data from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) shows that about 0.8 percent of federal employees were fired, between 2.4 to 3 percent
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resigned, and between 2.5 and 3.6 percent retired.180 While OMB does not retain distinct data on
rates of internal promotion and hiring, this exceeding low rate of exit (less than 7 percent)
suggests that promotion from outside the federal bureaucracy is relatively rare. The sheer
expected durability of federal employment tends to deepen identification with a home
institution.181 Simply put, officials who anticipate that their career will be entangled with a
specific institution have a reason to advance the interests of that institution qua institution.182
B.

Exit Rules

Institutional loyalty can be elicited by imposing costs on officials’ exit from an
institution. Costly institutional exit arises when officials incur high opportunity costs if they
depart an institution or obtain low or artificially suppressed returns from external opportunities.
As a result of the benefit of staying put and the costs of departure, officials are more likely to
remain in their home institution, and concomitantly more likely to identify their career goals with
the larger goals of the institution. Costly exit has been identified as an important mechanism in
both the labor economics and the public administration literature.183 Its links to constitutional and
statutory rules, not to mention its larger constitutional function, have so far received insufficient
attention.
Costly exit mechanisms operate in two ways. First, high returns to serving in an
institution increase the odds of longer terms of service. Longer civil-service tenures function in
this regard akin to life tenure for federal judges. In expectation, such tenures increase the degree
of identification between an official and the institution with which her career is entangled.
Regardless of the length of intended institutional service, moreover, high returns from continued
service can immediately benefit institutions. An official receiving large returns to institutional
service, like any well-compensated employee,184 is more likely to be well-disposed to her
institution, and hence more likely to formulate and adopt a view of what is in its best interest.
High returns, moreover, need not take a monetary form. Public officials can instead be
motivated by the opportunity to shape policy or by reputational gains.185 High-ranking officials
in all three branches of government are likely to have forsaken greater financial rewards in the
private sector in order to receive returns from policy influence. Chief Justice John Roberts, for
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instance, was earning more than one million dollars every year in private practice in 2003 when
he accepted President Bush’s nomination to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, and thereby embraced a position with roughly one-sixth the salary.186 His
tenure protection and opportunities for policy-related discretion are one form of compensation
for the opportunity costs of foregoing private practice. Indeed, to the extent that this effectual
wage is greater than Roberts’ market wage, life tenure may comprise an implicit efficiency
wage.187
A constitutional designer can use policy influence as a compensatory incentive in lieu of
pecuniary rewards, and thereby elicit institutional loyalty. Article III judges, for example, cannot
have their salary reduced while in office. Their salary is essentially a lifetime guaranteed annuity
so long as the judge is not impeached.188 This guarantee is justified as a (surely partial and
imperfect) way of ensuring “an independent Judiciary”189 that is “free from control by the
Executive and the Legislature.”190
An institutional function is thus pursued through the shaping of individual incentives. By
assigning judges the opportunity to influence the path of the law as an important form of implicit
compensation, the Constitution gives individual judges a stake in the judiciary as a whole. Their
policy discretion depends on the judiciary’s continued prestige and legitimacy. As a result,
judges have a strong incentive to maintain the institutional predicates of policy influence.
Further, the expectation of a durable judicial career means that even if a judge’s influence at a
given moment in time is minimal, her opportunities for shaping the law can reoccur over an
extended period of time—resulting in an eventually significant amount of policy influence.
Statutory regimes can also use the promise of policy influence to generate institutional
loyalty. Agency designers can allocate either substantive powers or formal titles as means to
assign both responsibility and influence to specific personnel.191 A recent example involves the
reorganization of the intelligence services after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to
include a new leadership position, a “Director of National Intelligence” (“DNI”).192 The DNI
was made by statute head of the intelligence community, the primary adviser to the President on
matters of intelligence related to national security, the authoritative voice on the intelligence
budget, and the hiring authority for key officials in the intelligence community.193 Whereas the
head of the intelligence community had formerly been the Central Intelligence Agency’s chief,
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the new DNI is independent of any specific component of the intelligence bureaucracy.194 By
augmenting the powers of the intelligence leadership position, while detaching it from any
specific agency, members of Congress hoped to instill a larger, government-wide sense of
mission in the office—one not dogged by the parochial concerns of a particular agency.195
Implicit in the DNI’s new powers, moreover, is the possibility that the office’s occupant would
be blamed politically if the intelligence community failed to prevent another spectacular terrorist
attack akin to 9/11. In this fashion, legislators may have hoped to align future DNIs’ interests
with the executive’s larger mission of mitigating national security risks rather than more
parochial institutional concerns.
The force of such bureaucratic incentives, however, often depends on the strength and
durability of the underlying agency. Implicit compensation in the form of policy discretion for
bureaucrats works better with robust and enduring agencies than with weak and transient
agencies. All else being equal, officials exercising policy discretion as a form of implicit
compensation thus have good reason to identify with and promote their institution’s persistence.
There is a strong empirical connection between the extent to which an institution is insulated
from presidential control and its durability.196 This suggests that an agency is less likely to attract
and cultivate expertise if it is under close presidential supervision because the marginal official
will be uncertain whether any context-specific expertise they accrue will be rendered valueless
by the dissolution of the agency. Institutional loyalty toward a specific agency or department—
and hence to the mission embodied in the statutes that agency is charged with enforcing—is
undermined by structural controls that increase a president’s control and influence.197 The
weaker presidential removal authority, the more durable an agency and the more likely its
officials are to invest in expertise.
The second species of costly exit mechanism takes the form of rules that inhibit or even
bar exit, especially to positions that provide higher returns than continued government service.
Officials are more inclined to identify with their institutions if there is no alternative career
pathway, such that they are more likely to pursue a longer career within government. Lower
returns from exit can result if officials have institution-specific investments that are not
transferable either to another institution within government or to the private sector.198 Low
returns to exit can also result from formal, legal prohibitions to exit. We consider each of these
possibilities in turn.
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Most obviously, institutional designers make exit costly by simple prohibitions on the
utilization of any capital obtained while an official within an institution. More institution-specific
investments are encouraged, by contrast, when substantial portions of capital obtained from
working within the institution cannot be monetized upon departure. The Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995, for example, bars former members of Congress from lobbying for a year,199 a
measure recently extended this prohibition to two years for Senators.200 Congress’s failure to bar
lobbying of agencies supervised by an individual legislator, however, may render these
prohibitions functionally ineffectual.201 On his first day in office in 2009, President Obama
issued an executive order barring federal employees from a wide range of lobbying activities for
two years.202 The following year, he barred lobbyists from serving on federal boards.203 Such
measures aim to gum up the “revolving door” between government and the private sector. When
successful, they lower the opportunity cost of remaining in public service by lowering the
expected pay-offs of exit. When discarded, they diminish institutional allegiance in favor of
baser concerns.
The second mechanism is less obvious. It relies on a connection between expertise
acquisition and costly exit. Federal officials develop institution-specific human capital by
maintaining responsibility for matters not routinely addressed by other public or private
institutions.204 The design of federal civil service laws often facilitates the acquisition of contextspecific human capital by employees, i.e., expertise and knowledge tightly wound into the
specific aims and policy goals of their home agency. Civil servants generally do not enter their
positions with the knowledge and skills needed to pursue institutional goals. Even a system of
merit selection will not select for the “most meritorious” employees in the potential applicant
pool unless “the [applicants] believe that their efforts and expertise will be applied to goals” that
they share.205 Such expertise is often “relationship specific” and “specifically tailored” to the
operational environment and goals of a particular agency.206 Tenure protection induces officials
to invest in that bespoke human capital. By inducing the acquisition of institution-specific
expertise, the civil service regime thus helps create a cadre of officials whose professional
standing, and whose specific expertise, is tightly linked to the specific agenda and policy goals of
their institution. These officials are, all else being equal, likely to rank the institution’s goals very
high.
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Consider, for instance, the Office of the Legal Advisor in the Department of State, or
“L”, an office renowned for the institutional orientation of its lawyers, even in comparison to
other legal offices within the executive branch.207 Many attorneys there work on matters of
public international law, a field with little substantial presence in other parts of the federal
government, state governments, or the private sector. Lawyers in “L” also invest in social
networks related to public international law through organizations like the American Society for
International Law. As we explain below,208 this generates human capital within that office that is
not as easily transferable even compared to that acquired in other forms of government legal
service. The result is longer tenures within L,209 and deeper identifications with that office and
the executive branch’s foreign policy missions more generally than otherwise might be the
case.210
Finally, the development of institution-specific human-capital helps elucidate why
political appointees tend over time to develop agency-level institutional loyalty that can
overpower partisan loyalty. Presidential appointees rely upon agency staff for knowledge and
expertise on policy questions.211 By becoming immersed in and acquainted with a complex body
of rules, those appointees also make personal investments in an epistemic resource that is
specific to a particular institution (the judiciary or an agency).212 This asset-specific investment
then ties the official’s interests to those of the agency in which he or she is embedded. As a
result, political appointees not infrequently defect from the partisan or ideological agenda of the
official’s putative executive-branch sponsor.213
C.

Institutional Mandates

We turn next to the first of two ways in which constitutional designers can take
advantage of organizational socialization to generate institutional loyalty. Unlike entrance and
exit rules, organizational socialization operates as a “treatment effect” rather than a selection
effect.214 In the following two sections, that is, we are concerned with ways in which the design
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of an institution can influence an individual’s perception of, and tendency to identify with, her
home institution. Our basic claim is that an institution’s dominant architectural elements can
elicit an internal culture in which institutional loyalty will thrive.
We begin by isolating a simple element of institutional design—institutional mandate–-as
a significant determinant of institutional loyalty. The stronger an institution’s mandate, we
suggest, the more likely institutional loyalty will emerge. We then explore how different design
choices observed in either constitutional or statutory contexts either diminish or augment
relevant social networks.
1.

Defining and Cultivating Institutional Mandates

Governmental institutions—whether a branch or an entity within a branch—are typically
understood by participants and observers alike to have a set of purposes or functions. These
constitute its mandate. An institution’s mandate need not be articulated in a constitution or an
organic statute, although they often are. Institutional loyalty can be understood in terms of an
officials’ endorsement of those purposes and functions into their own preference set.
An institutional mandate can be created by the constitutional provision or statute that
creates an institution. Alternatively, it might be a result of policy entrepreneurship by agency
leaders with strong policy agendas.215 Institutional leadership can expend resources priming new
officials on the importance of particular functions or aims. They can equip new appointees with
the epistemic resources and practical capability to understand and execute a mandate. Even when
not backed by such investments, both written and informal mandates can serve as “focal points,”
helping to coordinate actors’ expectations and behavior in light of some institutional ends and
not others.216 Common knowledge of the agency’s mandate, for instance, may provide a basis for
coordination among officials who otherwise have little knowledge of peers in physically remote
offices or functionally separate divisions of the agency. Such coordination, Tiberiu Dragu and
Mattias Polborn have recently demonstrated, is particularly important in maintaining the rule of
law against the efforts of potentially autocratic leaders.217 When administrators expect each other
to resist unlawful policies, they show formally, legal constraints on political leaders are more
likely to be self-enforcing.218
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Of importance to our analysis, an institution’s mandate need not be unitary. By
substantive command or via the imposition of procedural obligations,219 an agency can be tasked
with a plurality of goals. There is not a sharp divide between unitary and plural mandates, but
rather a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, an entity might be assigned a substantively
narrow obligation that requires little by way of discretionary judgment or expertise. The
institution’s objections also may be connected to official action by a relatively short causal chain.
A DMV tasked solely with examining potential drivers and distributing permits to them has
something of this character.
At the other end of the spectrum, an entity might have several, potentially conflicting
goals that relate to official actions through long and uncertain causal chains.220 The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), for example, is “charged both with ensuring that new drugs placed
on the market are safe and effective (a task that generally requires cautious and deliberate action)
and also with speedily granting access for doctors and patients to those new, safe, and effective
drugs (a task that requires expeditious review of those drugs).”221 The FDA, when pursuing these
conflicting mandates of safety and public health, necessarily makes compromises between
incommensurable ends.
The key point for a (big-c or a small-c) constitutional designer is that the internal
heterogeneity of an institutional mandate influences the extent to which officials are likely, or
even able, to formulate institutional loyalty. The more plural and the more abstract an entity’s
goals, the more disagreement there is likely to arise among even insiders about how best to carry
out mandate. In the stylized examples we have just offered, it is much easier (and hence less
costly) to discern the institutional mandate for the DMV branch office than for the FDA’s.
Entities with more diverse institutional mandates, accordingly, are less likely to be populated by
officials with institutional loyalty than entities with singular and unitary mandates.222
The effect of institutional architecture on mandates is evident both at a constitutional and
a statutory level. With the Constitution, both single-mandate and multiple-mandate branches can
be observed. Textualist constitutional scholars draw a distinction between a “unitary” executive
and the “plural” judiciary and legislature.223 Although the force of this textual argument is
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disputed,224 the simple contrast between unitary and plural branches plainly has some force. The
relatively hierarchical structure of the executive juxtaposes with the relatively flat structure of
the legislative branch (in which each legislator’s vote formally has the same weight within a
given chambers). It is thus no surprise we commonly talk of the “Obama” or “Trump”
presidency, and not the Ryan/McConnell Congress.225 Those labels suggest a widely shared
belief that (1) there is a singular measure of branch-level performance for Article II, and (2)
successes and failures can be attached to a specific office holder for the executive, but not
Congress.
Even if two institutions have the same functions, the way in which they execute that
function can influence the extent of relevant officials’ loyalty and zeal in pursuing that function.
Consider the distinct ways in which the executive and the legislative mediate political
competition. Playing this function renders the former more likely than the latter to conceive an
institutional mandate. The quadrennial presidential election provides for the diachronic alteration
of power between partisan factions. Effectual political power under Article II comes in a unitary
package, which changes hands periodically.
By contrast, while Congress too has periodic elections, its plurality and heterogeneity
invite an additional element of synchronic political competition. The simultaneous possession of
political power by plural, adverse factions generate barriers to the identification of a shared
Article I mandate precisely because Congress folds in partisan divisions in a way the White
House does not. This is no accident: The housing of political contestation is now recognized as a
central function of democratic legislatures.226 Hence, even though Congress and the Presidency
have a similar democratic mandate—channeling political conflict into formal, legal outcomes—
differences in how that mandate is configured over time radically influences their expected
institutional loyalty.
Once more, it would be a mistake to think that the federal constitution exhausts the range
of possible configurations that might elicit strong institutional mandates. Consider the possibility
of a single-mission branch. Absent from our national organic document, this idea is pursued with
vigor at the state constitutional level. In that context, executive power is often “unbundled” into
mandate-specific offices, each of which is subject to separate election.227 A majority of states
thus directly elect an Attorney General, a Lieutenant Governor, and a Secretary of State, as well
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as a governor.228 This unbundling of functions into distinct executive bodies will in expectation
amplify institutional loyalty: For it is much easier for an official within an unbundled executive
to identify and align herself with a singular goal (e.g., crime control, efficient provision of social
services) than it is for an official within a bundled executive to assemble an institutional loyalty.
In the administrative law context, where both single- and multiple-mandate agencies
abound, there is ample anecdotal evidence that single-mandate agencies tend to foster a
“dedicated but zealous” culture that is somewhat tone-deaf to “the arguments and ideas of
policy-makers in other agencies as well as in the White House.”229 Hence, a recent quantitative
study of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) elicited the view from within the agency
that EPA staff tend to be focused “narrowly on environmental interests,” in contrast to the
“broader perspective” taken by the White House.230 Even multiple-mandate missions tend to
focus on one mission at the expense of others.231 Officials who favor the losing mandate are
hardly inclined to hew unreservedly to the institution’s subsequent path. They are thus unlikely
to evince institutional loyalty to the same extent.
Finally, an institutional mandate may have a dynamic effect on the selection into and out
of the institution. If an institution is renowned for its mandate, not only are officials with a prior
commitment to that mandate likely to select in, but also once embedded in the institution, are
more likely to make non-transferable mandate-specific investments in expertise. This makes exit
costlier. For example, if the EPA is known to maintain a commitment to combating climate
change, rather than fostering polluting industries, it will be less likely to attract staff who are
climate change skeptics.232 And vice versa. Officials hired will then redouble their epistemic
investments to make the EPA’s mission (however conceived) a success. The result is a positivefeedback mechanism by which the strength of an institutional mandate increases over time.
In summary, how institutions are sliced up, whether by function or by subject-matter,
directly shapes the extent their officials tend to develop institutional loyalty. Insulation from
synchronic partisan conflict, pursuit of an indivisible mission, and the elimination of plural
conflicting mandates—all these are likely to conduce to sharper institutional loyalty.
2.

Diluting Institutional Mandates

Cultivating an institutional mandate, however, is not costless. The channeling of political
conflict into a single legislative forum, for example, is a central element of constitutional
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design.233 Even if Congress is, as a result of playing this function, unable to muster the same
level of institutional loyalty as the executive, its role as a forum for routine partisan contestation
is sufficiently important not to be derogated. There are a number of other design elements,
however, that fragment institutional mandates and so undermine institutional loyalty in pursuit of
other public values. The resulting trade-offs have not yet been identified. We consider the
interaction of mandates with the “internal separation of powers”234 to illustrate such conflicts.
Skepticism about the constraining effect of the separation of powers has induced some
scholars to advocate alternatively for an “internal” separation of powers.235 The idea of an
“internal” separation of power has an oxymoronic aspect. One prominent commentator suggests
that they can be understood as mechanisms that “seek to achieve [the interbranch separation of
power’s] goals by operating within the confines of a single branch.”236 Leading examples include
the separation of adjudication from rule-making or prosecutorial functions within administrative
agencies, and the creation of “independent” agencies that exercise a measure of policy discretion
free of presidential control.237
Whether or not these design elements have independent justifications,238 it seems likely
that their installation would dilute branch-level (and sometimes agency-level) institutional
loyalty. Functional or policy-mission-based distinctions within a branch foster plural, rather than
unitary, understandings of a branch’s mandate. The very function of independent agencies, such
as the Federal Reserve, is to create acoustic separation between short-term partisan interests and
longer-term systemic goals.239 Similarly, “dissent channels,” which allow career bureaucrats to
voice frustrations about an administration’s policy and which have also been championed as
form of internal separation-of-powers, might have benefits in defeating group-think.240 But
because they have costs in terms of diluting institutional loyalty at the level of the branch, there
is a trade-off between fostering loyalty to the branch as opposed to a subunit such as an agency.
Consider by way of example the decision of career diplomats within the State
Department recently to use a dissent channel to challenge the Obama White House’s limited
military deployment in the Syrian conflict.241 Their memorandum aired, and hence likely
compounded, “deep rifts and lingering frustrations” within the executive.242 The mere
233

GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 24, at 18-20 (defining constitutional performance by the extent to which quotidian
political conflict is channeled in nonviolent, discursive forums, among other goals).
234
See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of
Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009); Katyal, supra note 6, at 2316-25.
235
See Metzger, supra note 234, at 427-37 (describing examples of administrative structures that operate as an
“internal” separation of powers); Katyal, supra note 6, at 2316-25 (advocating greater internal separation of powers
in the face of increasing congressional abdication).
236
Metzger, supra note 234, at 427-28.
237
Id. at 429-30.
238
Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 84, at 898 (arguing that internal separation-of-power proposals are “self
defeating”).
239
The Federal Reserve’s relationship to the White House is rather more complicated than the conventional story
would suggest. Gregory A. Krause, Federal Reserve Policy Decision Making: Political and Bureaucratic Influences,
38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 124, 135-36 (1994) (finding “significant evidence for presidential influence on consensual
decision making” by the Reserve’s Board of Governors).
240
Katyal, supra note 6, at 2328-29.
241
Mark Landler, 51 Diplomats Urge Strikes Against Assad in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2016, at A1.
242
Id.

41

availability of a dissent channel undercuts pressure toward conformity on a single executivebranch position.243 It hence acts as a friction on the formation of executive-oriented institutional
loyalty.
D.

Social Networks

Institutional loyalty is generated when officials are part of “social networks”244 that
generate and reinforce commitments to an institution. That social networks influence the
behavior and preferences of political officials and citizens is now “well established
empirically.”245 This is because “[p]eople frequently think and do what they think and do
because of what they think relevant others think and do.”246 This section renders this intuition in
slightly more formal terms, and integrates it with the literature on constitutional design, which
has largely ignored the topic.247
The social networks of government officials influence behavior and preferences through
at least two pathways. First, networks shape the “epistemic community”248 in which officials
operate. Social networks help define the “argument pools”249 to which officials are exposed.
Information diffuses quickly through social networks. The stronger the network, the faster the
information diffuses, and the stronger its influence on argument pools.250 Empirical studies of
official behavior thus identify strong “peer effects” by which “bureaucrats' responses to

243

For example, the Syria dissent did not address the potential costs and risks of state collapse in Syria, a risk the
U.S. military prioritizes. Id.
244
See BETSY SINCLAIR, THE SOCIAL CITIZEN: PEER NETWORKS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR xi (2012) (defining a
social network as “the complex collection of relationships that arise from each person’s geography, work, and
leisure activities”).
245
James H. Fowler et al., Causality in Political Networks, 39 AM. POL. RES. 437, 438 (2011); accord David A.
Siegel, Social Networks and Collective Action, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 122, 122 (2009) (“Across social science, a wealth
of empirical evidence illustrates the ways in which social interactions can alter choice.”).
246
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 77 (2001).
247
An exception is Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1271 (2009) (discussing social networks in the cooperative federalism context).
248
See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 42 (1983). For applications to
government, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997);
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1
(1992).
249
See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational
Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 995 (1992) (explaining the implications of limited argument pools); cf. Timur
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 715-35 (1999)
(discussing how limited argument pools shape preferences).
250
By the “strength” of a network, we mean a number of variables that characterize relationships. Daniel J. Brass,
Kenneth D. Butterfield, & Bruce C. Skaggs, Relationships and Unethical Behavior: A Social Network Perspective,
23 ACAD. MG’MT REV. 14, 17 (1998) (“The strength of a relationship refers to the frequency, reciprocity, emotional
intensity, and intimacy of that relationship. Casual acquaintances, represented by infrequent interaction and
indifferent affect, are characterized by weak ties.”). Information traveling between stronger ties is more likely to be
duplicative. Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201, 204
(1983); Gabriel Weimann, The Strength of Weak Conversational Ties in the Flow of Information and Influence, 5
SOC. NETWORKS 245, 260-63 (1983).

42

uncertainty turn less on supervisory instructions and more upon what they perceive peer
bureaucrats to be doing.”251
Second, internal social networks generate reputational costs for officials straying from an
institutional orthodoxy. Networks reduce monitoring costs. It is cheaper to obtain and evaluate
information about close colleagues or friends. These networks have proven important. The
leading study of bureaucratic autonomy, by Daniel Carpenter identified such social networks as a
critical tool for professional administrators, who used their alternative power base “in political
and social networks” to reduce “their dependence on elected officials.”252 Social networks thus
provide a way of collectively amassing and exercising power on something other than an
ideological or partisan basis. In the early Republic, Chief Justice John Marshall showed a canny
awareness of that possibility by insisting that the Justices all reside together in a board-house.
Marshall aimed “to use the camaraderie of boarding-house life to dispel dissent and achieve a
one-voiced Opinion of the Court.”253
With these mechanisms in hand, it is possible to pick out a number of ways in which
institutional designers exploit or resist social networks to generate institutional loyalties. To
begin with, numerous constitutional rules, conventions, and statutory rules are usefully
understood as efforts to cultivate intra-institutional networks and tamp down on crossinstitutional networks. The Incompatibility Clause of Article I, for example, states that “No
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office.”254 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 76, if legislators were
serving in and thereby interacting with the executive branch, there would be a constant source of
“executive influence upon the legislative body.”255 Analogously, the Supreme Court has recently
reiterated that the Due Process Clause bars state and federal judges alike from deciding cases
under the excessive influence of either legislative or executive-branch actors.256
Textual anti-networking rules are supplemented by weaker conventions.257 When Justice
Abe Fortas was nominated to become Chief Justice, he was defeated in part because of
revelations of his close relationship with President Lyndon Johnson.258 This generated an
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informal convention against the Justices being an essential and close part of the network of
senior officials within the other branches of government, motivated in part by a concern that such
ties would compromise the institutional loyalty of the Justices.259 This convention, though, is not
as strong as a constitutional rule. Hence, in 2004, when Vice President Cheney went hunting
with Justice Antonin Scalia even as a case denominated with his name was before the Court,
loud objections were raised by commentators260 and by litigants.261 In contrast to Fortas,
however, Justice Scalia publicly defended his decision not to recuse himself by pointing out the
mundaneness of cross-branch social networking. “Social contacts with high-level executive
officials (including cabinet officers),” he explained in a letter to the Los Angeles Times, “have
never been thought improper for judges who may have before them cases in which those people
are involved in their official capacity, as opposed to their personal capacity.”262 It may well be
that this successful defense has eroded the post-Fortas convention somewhat.
Consonant with Justice Scalia’s defense, there are many ways in which the Constitution
remains open to interbranch networks. For example, there is no Due Process Clause bar to
executive or legislative influence on a coordinate political branch.263 If anything, the Framers
seemed more concerned about preventing officials sharing social networks with those in power
in state governments than preventing officials sharing social networks with those in other
branches of the federal government. The creation of a new national capital beyond the control of
state governments, for example, was meant to prevent federal officials becoming too intertwined
with state officials.264
Other constitutional rules generate social networks that reinforce rather than reduce
institutional loyalty. Providing the head of an institution with strong control over their institution
can lead them to surround themselves with members of their social network.265 Consider again
Vice President Cheney’s defense of a unitary and powerful executive branch.266 Cheney himself
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wielded unprecedented control over the operations of the Office of the Vice President, using this
power to surround himself with friends and allies.267 This personnel-related authority allowed
him to translate ideas diffusing through his external social network about the merits of a
powerful executive268 into institutional practice operationalized through an internal network of
fellow travellers.269 External social networks, including law professors and other legal experts,
here helped aggrandize the branch’s authority.
Institutions can also be part of wider professional social networks that cut across the
public/private divide, and that police adherence to institutional norms while at the same time
providing legitimation and public support. Elements of the “thick political surround” can also
feature institution-specific investments that would be endangered by official behavior that defies
loyalty. Because officials are networked with these actors, they are exposed to pressure to
conform to institutional norms, but also benefit from an extraneous source of political capital.
Such networks are particularly robust in respect to the Article III judiciary; they help
explain one of our motivating examples, Chief Justice Roberts’s decisive vote in NFIB v.
Sebelius.270 The Chief Justice, and the Court as a whole, is embedded in a larger social network
of commentators, think-tanks, scholars and lawyers, largely located inside the Beltway.271 This
network has been reinforced by the recent development of a powerful “Supreme Court Bar”
comprising many leading national law firms.272 This diffuse network is an important source of
criticism, and hence social pressure toward certain sorts of institutional behavior epitomized by
the so-called “Greenhouse effect.” This is the alleged phenomenon “in which some Supreme
Court Justices have drifted away from the conservatism of their early votes … towards the stated
preferences of cultural elites, including left-leaning journalists and the ‘liberal legal
establishment that dominates at elite law schools.’”273 Although this purported dynamic has a
partisan flavor at present (at least in the accounts that circulate in the media), it is also possible
that the Justices’ integration into this network reinforces professional norms respecting legal
craft and precision in ways that are nonideological in character.
This social network also provides an important source of validation and political support
for the Court as an institution. The Court derives legitimacy and strength from this network—
from the commentators on the left and right who routinely identify the Court as a vital national
institution, from the many elite law firms that rely on it for prestige (and even business), and
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from the media that pay obsessive attention to the Justices and their doing. In short, the Court’s
social network provides ballast that both strengthens and also roots it to particular institutional
practices and norms.
*

*

*

*

To summarize, some basic, architectural choices about how branches and agencies are set
up strongly shape the possibility of institutional loyalty. As we explore further below,
institutional loyalty may or may not be desirable. To the extent they are thought desirable,
though, the design decisions that conduce to shared institutional mandates should take them into
consideration.
III.

Recalibrating Institutional Loyalties

We shift in this Part from description and analysis to a more normative stance. Having
isolated the nature and importance of institutional loyalties, and their causal origins, we consider
how individual officials’ loyalty within each branch might be usefully recalibrated. Our aim in
this Part is to be illustrative, offering suggestions, rather than firm or final diagnoses. We hope to
demonstrate that the recalibration of institutional loyalty is a valuable, yet to date
underappreciated, mechanism for attaining larger constitutional goals.
A measure of caution is counseled by the background complexity of the separation of
powers. That constitutional tradition is animated by multiple normative ambitions, including
liberty, democratic accountability, and rule-of-law promotion.274 These goals can and do clash.275
We do not aim to settle the profound normative questions of how to optimize over competing
constitutional ends across different contexts here. Nor do we tackle in this Article the difficult
questions of which kinds of branch-level reforms are incentive-compatible.276 Because our
ambition here is to show the conceptual utility of institutional loyalty, we will put to one side
process-related questions of how one gets from “here to there.”277 In short, the branch-by-branch
illustrations of pathways for institutional reform that we offer below should be taken as a “proof
of concept,” not a strict agenda for institutional reform.
Our analysis, moreover, makes no strong assumptions about the motives of an
institutional designer. This raises an important criticism: Are we answering the question of how
institutional dispositions arise by simply shifting the problem from the level of design to
designer? What good does the identification of a toolkit do if adequate motivational foundations
274
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for designers are unavailable? There are, in fact, several reasons why institutional designers have
good cause to consider how their choices influence officials’ dispositions. Most importantly,
most designers want their institutional progeny to succeed. Official dispositions keyed to a
particular institution are often necessary to the latter’s successful operation. Explaining the
importance of a shared “corporate culture” among managers, David Kreps has pointed out that
culture furnishes focal points for the resolution of unexpected contingencies “in the minds of its
hierarchical inferiors.”278 Investment in a joint (institutional) project also means that external
actors can confidently develop “stable expectations” about institutions’ likely behavior.279
In addressing the utility of reforms that leverage institutional loyalty for each branch in
turn, we begin by offering a hypothesis as to whether the branch is appropriately characterized
by excessive or insufficient incentives to heed the branch’s interests. We recognize that these
baselines are controversial. Our purpose in specifying them, however, is to facilitate an analysis
of the feasible design margins that can be recalibrated to generate institutional loyalties. Readers
with a different normative prior should therefore attend to the lessons for institutional design,
rather than our stipulated baselines. Having set a (provisional) normative baseline, we then work
from the causal pathways identified in Part II to recommendations for how the surfeit or
deficiency of institutional loyalty respectively might be mitigated.
A.

The Executive Branch’s Incentives Refocused

Today, the executive branch exercises extensive policy authority regardless of the party
or the president in power.280 This authority is mediated through entities, such as the National
Security Council and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which are able to
cultivate high degrees of institutional loyalty via selective entrance rules, a complex civil-service
regime, and the existence of durable career paths wholly within the federal government. The net
result is that high-level executive personnel are generally characterized to a far greater degree by
institutional loyalty relative to their congressional analogs. Hence, Article II-related loyalties are
in no immediate risk of being crowded entirely out by partisan or ideological loyalty. If they are
threatened at all, it is by loyalties to more granular units, such as departments and agencies.281
We hence assume an executive characterized by strong institutional loyalty toward the
branch as a whole, and even stronger loyalties to agencies and departments. Given this rough
baseline, we consider how institutional loyalties might be refocused toward the branch, rather
than the agency or department, level, and, alternatively, how more government-wide preferences
might be cultivated. We examine closely the merits of expanding on the rotation system that
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authorizes executive branch officials to work outside of their usual institutional setting for a
period of time.282
Job responsibilities for all employees, including those in the executive branch, can be
sliced and allocated using many different tools. Executive branch responsibilities can be bundled
into permanent parcels (called “portfolios” in Washington speak) that are assigned to particular
executive branch officials. This is the normal practice in the executive branch, where officials
work for many years in the same offices with roughly the same portfolios—with small
exceptions.283 Civil servants in the executive branch tend to be promoted within the same agency
or department in the executive branch, rather than moving between them. Political appointees
tend to go “in and out” of the executive branch, rather than moving between agencies or
departments within the executive branch.284 All this entrenches agency-level loyalties.
In contrast, rotations within the executive branch mitigate loyalties that stop at the agency
or department door. Federal law now recognizes executive job rotations, but imposes numerous
limitations on them.285 The most reliable data produced by the federal government has also found
a very small number of “detailees,”286 the technical term for those detailed to another part of the
executive branch or another branch entirely.287 The alumni of these rotations are not only likely
to generate complicated institutional loyalties, but also to be effective in pursuing those
complicated loyalties. A number of empirical studies suggest that accrual of “specific human
capital” in the form of relationships with other officials predicts “effectiveness in office.”288
Job rotations within and between branches expand loyalties to the branch by leveraging
several of the mechanisms identified in Part II. Entrance mechanisms, for example, can select for
those detailees most likely to generate and manage loyalties to both their home and detailed
institution. Detailees can be assigned to a new institution only if their home institution—usually
at the highest level—agrees that a temporary assignment would be useful after the detailee
returns.289 The new, temporary institutional employer must also approve the detailee, and
282
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sometimes must pay them out of their limited budget.290 These entrance mechanisms are
essentially screening tools to identify those capable of the more complicated institutional
loyalties that flow from detailing. An alternative approach is to vary employee assignments
across time. Temporary task bundling (also known as “job rotation”291 or using a “Type Z
organization”292) means assigning officials for short periods of time to distinct tasks.293 These
distinct and temporary tasks can be allocated to officials while these officials remain in their
current position.294
Exit mechanisms can also encourage asset-specific investments in the home institution of
the detailee, as well as in the potential future or actual present institution to which the official is
detailed. Detailees invest in their home institution because they have a position there. Investing
in that position will yield continued and potentially improving employment prospects there in the
future. The cost of exiting a home institution, though, is mitigated by job rotations. Rotation
creates new social networks and employment opportunities, mitigating the costs of exiting a
home institution. Once a detail is arranged, moreover, the actual experience of working in a new
institutional setting makes the possibility of exit more concrete, and hence less costly.
The social context of the detailee is also transformed by their temporary assignment.
There is a strong relationship between whom officials work with and who are the strongest nodes
in their social networks.295 After a civil servant works for years for an executive branch agency
or department, these connections within their agency or department can become even stronger.
Political appointees, for instance, receive their executive branch positions because of their strong
and weak ties to other political elites who have been are or will be political appointees.296
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Rotations mean that networks are expanded to include those outside of their home
institution. Upon return to their home institution, a detailee has likely internalized many of the
perspectives of the officials they added to their network from their temporary institutional home.
Scholars of employees in the public sector have often found that “employees adapt their behavior
consistent with the norms and expectations of people around them,”297 in “profound” and
persistent ways.298 Going forward, newly networked officials become regular parts of the
personal and professional network of the detailed official, generating loyalties to their temporary
institutional home even after an official return home.
Job rotations within the executive branch can therefore be a tool used by those arguing
for the need for a more holistic Article II perspective. The Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), for
instance, has been criticized by scholars such as Bruce Ackerman for being unduly loyal to the
power of the President.299 OLC lawyers tend to move to other positions outside of the executive
branch, such as becoming law professors, or move into the White House.300 An OLC lawyer who
spent months working for the equally elite Office of the Legal Advisor in the Department of
State might thus be less skeptical of international law constraints on presidential power.301
Reformers could also use rotations to dilute an Article II orientation. Executive branch
officials can be temporarily detailed to another executive branch agency or department, or to the
legislative or judicial branch. Job rotations from the executive branch to the other branches in
particular sensitize the executive branch to the legislative and judicial branches. The executive
branch dominates the federal government, with more than 2.7 million employees.302 It should not
be surprising that it is quite common in Washington to find executive branch officials sharing
social networks with entirely or almost entirely other executive branch officials—they are the
overwhelming majority of officials living in Washington after all.303 If officials are working on
more, and more varied, issues, they are more likely to build more heterogeneous social networks
that incorporate Congress, the federal courts and even the private sector. These wider social
networks may deflate past institutional loyalties not only because they change officials’ sources
for information, but also because they serve as pathways to alternative, non-executive positions.
There is evidence that earlier professional experiences in another branch of government
generate loyalties to that branch that endure even after an official has moved on to another
branch. Empirical studies have found, for instance, that federal judges are more likely to rule in
favor of the executive branch if they have served in the executive branch earlier in their
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careers.304 Courts have also noted the complex loyalties held by those who have moved offices,
characterizing such personnel as a blend of an employee of their old institution, an employee of
their new institution, and an independent contractor.305 There is every reason to believe that a
recent job rotation would have roughly the same—or greater—loyalty-generating power as a
professional experience decades earlier would have. The OLC lawyer who spends several
months working for the Senate Judiciary Committee would have a different sense of presidential
power than the OLC lawyer who never left the executive branch.306
Job rotations across branches, though, are rare. When they do happen, detailee traffic
tends to be from the legislature (and sometimes the courts) to the executive—and rarely the other
way around. Federal law authorizes detailing of executive branch officials to House or Senate
committees, but does not do the same for the personal staffs of members of the House or
Senate.307 The relatively formidable power of the modern executive branch means that the
attraction of working in the executive branch is substantial. The polarized and despised Congress
has a harder time attracting talented staffers.308 Job rotations across branches right now,
therefore, serve to spread the gospel about the importance of executive branch loyalty, rather
than tempering it.309
B.

Judicial Ambition and the Rule of Law

Institutional loyalties within the federal judiciary might be supposed an unfettered good
insofar as they conduce toward “judicial independence” from the Congress and the executive
branch.310 The implicit assumption of this view is that by negating the influence of coordinate
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branches, structural protections of judicial independence enable judges to exercise their
independent judgment about what law (and law alone) requires. But this need not be so. Over the
course of the twentieth century, the federal judiciary developed an unprecedented institutional
heft, and has successfully secured “important authority over key jurisdictional and administrative
powers.”311 In a vivid display of an institutional loyalty at work, Chief Justice William Howard
Taft extensively lobbied Congress on behalf of the federal courts, and secured to the Supreme
Court almost unfettered discretion over its caseload, near plenary authority to set its own agenda,
and freedom to determine how and why it would intervene on matters of national salience.312
Yet it is far from clear that the fruits of the discretion achieved by Taft and other
advocates for the institutional judiciary necessarily promote useful constitutional ends. As Pam
Karlan succinctly explains, “[j]udges should be independent, not so much so that they can
conceive goals and policies of their own and realize them, but so that they can enforce the goals
and policies embodied in the Constitution and the laws enacted by the democratic branches.”313
Bipartisan coalitions of the Supreme Court have narrowed dramatically the range of
constitutional remedies available to criminal defendants, prisoners challenging their convictions
via habeas corpus, ordinary citizens engaged in retail encounters with the state.314 The same trend
can be observed in the context of statutory civil-rights remedies.315 That these restrictive
transformations have a “long and bipartisan pedigree”316 is suggestive of their institutional roots:
They reflect the judiciary’s institutional interest in stanching the flow of certain kinds of
litigation.317
As a consequence of institutional loyalties, individual rights’ holders are no longer able to
vindicate entitlements through ex post remedies in federal court.318 Viewed in this light,
institutional loyalties in the Article III context are, paradoxically, inconsistent with promotion of
the constitutional rule of law and at odds with conventional notions of corrective justice and
deterrence.
What might be done, then, to mitigate forms of judicial self-regard with unwelcome
implications for constitutional rights holders? Setting aside the pressing question of how such
reform might occur, we develop one suggestion here in some detail.
311
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Since 1886 Congress has fashioned separate adjudicative mechanisms “for the bringing
of suits against the Government of the United States.”319 In respect to remedies that can be
granted through a free-standing adjudicative process—rather than, say, as incidental proceedings
embedded within a criminal prosecution—in a specialized court staffed by an institutionally
distinct cadre of judges. The advantage of such a bespoke cadre of judges is the fostering of a
discrete and separate institutional mandate from Article III’s. Legislators might leverage the
focal-point effect provided by a new jurisdictional statute, assigning cases to a discrete pool of
judges separately and distinctly charged with the vindication of constitutional and civil rights.
Congress might model this new judicial arm on the bankruptcy bench, although a new
‘remedies bench’ should have plenary Article III protection. The bankruptcy courts have
successfully exhibited “Article III values” as a consequence of a social-network effect—a
“continued connection to an audience—the bankruptcy bar” that “holds in high esteem
professional, creative, and non-ideological resolution of complex disputes.”320 To leverage the
same sort of social-network effect, Congress might employ an entrance rule—a requirement that
appointees to this have litigated in the past in behalf of a constitutional right or a statutory civil
right. In contrast to the current federal courts, which are dominated by former federal
prosecutors,321 the resulting bench would come to public service already aligned to the
institutional goal of providing remedies to individuals harmed by government’s unconstitutional
or unlawful action. It would also be entangled from the start in social networks in which the
social value of individualized remediation for constitutional wrongs is well understood.
We are, of course, under no illusions that Congress as currently constituted is about to
expend effort on behalf of a dispersed and hardly high-status population of constitutional rights
holders (although we are also of the view that legal scholars should not self-censor based on
present political realities322). Our point here is rather to demonstrate the causal mechanisms we
have identified in Part II—entrance and exit rules, institutional mandates, and social networks—
have a continuing role to play in refining our federal institutions toward public-regarding
constitutional ends.
C.

Congress ‘Redivivus’?

It is common ground that Congress today is characterized by a “radical separation
between the two major political parties.”323 Regardless of whether ideological bifurcation within
319
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Congress reflects changes in public preferences,324 there is a measure of consensus today that a
polarized Congress does not, and cannot, serve the nation well.325 Similarly, there is a
widespread view that “lobbyist[s]” possess too much influence in Congress, with many believing
that special-interest bribery of Congress is just “[t]he way things work in Congress.”326
These two popular diagnoses are not wholly consonant with one another.327 Nonetheless,
they suggest broad agreement on one point: Legislators are excessively motivated by partisan
and ideological328 interests, perhaps as well as by pure pecuniary ones. Concomitantly,
institutional loyalty seems in short supply on Capitol Hill. Scholars since John Hart Ely have
doubted Congress’s ability “to pull up its socks and reclaim its rightful authority” against the
executive branch.329 Our analysis in this section stipulates, as a baseline matter, an insufficiently
institutionally loyal legislative branch. How might the repertoire of design modifications
canvassed in Part II inform efforts to reform a Congress of that sort? We develop a potential
avenue of reform that employs many of the mechanisms we identified in Part II.
We focus on congressional staff, not legislators themselves. The legislature’s entrance
and exit rules for such staff might be reformed to create an executive branch-style congressional
civil service durably disposed towards the institution of Congress.330 Legal scholars focus on the
optimal distribution of civil servants versus political appointees in the executive branch. The
parallel question in the legislative-branch context receives scant attention. Scholars like Abbe
Gluck and Lisa Bressman have started to fill this void by offering thick descriptions of
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congressional staffers’ beliefs and behavior.331 We build here on Gluck and Bressman’s
impressive work by considering ways to strengthen staffers’ institutional loyalty.
Constitutional doctrine already recognizes that congressional staff matter. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, senators’ and representatives’ aides in particular possess a
measure of authority that rivals, and perhaps sometimes even surpasses, that of executive-branch
officials.332 Elected officials in Congress spend large portions of their time on election-related
tasks.333 They spend much of their time outside of Washington and hence away from the daily
legislative activities in Congress.334 They hence depend on staffers, who often act as their agents
during intra-branch negotiations335 and as their conduit to constituents.336 Because there are
comparatively few staffers in Congress, each staffer can wield substantial power.337 The
increasing complexity of policy, moreover, means that legislators as principals can imperfectly
monitor the myriad choices staffers as agents are constantly making.
Empowerment, however, does not translate into an institutional orientation.
Congressional staffers are usually divided into one of two categories. There are “personal staff”
who work for the representative or senator directly, or “committee” staff (often called
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“professional staff”338) who work for the House or Senate committee. To begin with, the
selection and promotion rules for staffers—including so-called professional staffers—do not
conduce currently to positive loyalty toward Congress as an institution.
Neither competitive examinations nor objective merit-related criteria are employed in
hiring most congressional staffers akin to those used in the civil service.339 Aides instead are
hired by representatives and senators based on their loyalty towards their immediate boss, their
political party, and their ideology. Often, staffers are evaluated on the basis of past performance
in the quite difference context of a congressional campaign.340 The number of professional staff
has been declining substantially over the years.341 Professional staff are usually hired through
partisan networks anyway, with few exceptions. And while executive-branch civil servants are
promoted based on criteria favoring the more institutionally disposed,342 most congressional
staffers do not last long enough to be meaningfully promoted.343 An important exception, we
note, is the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), one of the products of the 1974 framework
budget legislation,344 and an institution expressly modeled on the executive branch’s
operation.345
Further, exit-related dynamics do not foster meaningful institutional loyalties to
Congress. There are no intrinsic rewards to identifying with Congress as an institution. Congress
remains much maligned by public opinion.346 Material returns to congressional service are also
low. Congressional staffers are poorly paid, work long hours and usually can be removed at any
time—most importantly when their elected boss retires or loses re-election.
Instead, staffers have rich exit options in both the executive branch and the private sector.
For those driven by partisan or ideological goals, there are enormous returns to going to work for
the executive, especially in comparison to the contemporary Congress.347 An executive branch
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position may allow the former staffer to help draft regulations or litigate path-making cases. Both
may carry more policy heft, and more intrinsic appeal, than legislative trench warfare. Private
sector lobbying positions, in contrast, offers not only the potential for influence, but also
substantially higher salaries. Staffers routinely double their salary by defecting to the private
sector.348 For staffers whose former bosses remains in office, lobbying work is especially
lucrative.349 This creates an incentive for earlier rather than later exit from public service.
Compounding the institutional-loyalty deficit, congressional staffers do not organize
around the singular institutional mandates that generate loyal officials in some agencies and
departments in the executive branch.350 Congress has a broad and diffuse portfolio of
responsibilities, not the focused portfolio of a single-mission institution.351 Members of Congress
do not usually divide portfolios within their offices along discrete policy lines. Personal staff will
cover a range of political and policy portfolios, and given the shortage of staff members those
dedicated to policy matters will usually have multiple and diverse policy issues in their
portfolios.
Committee staff are unified by their nominal commitment to the mandate of their
committee. Committee mandates, though, are purposefully broad.352 They might perceive
themselves to be part of the policy community that is within their committee’s jurisdiction—a
lawyer for the Senate Judiciary Committee, for instance, feels part of the legal community. This
is limited, though, because committee staffers that are hired and fired by majority or minority
members will feel that their “mandate” is ultimately to serve whatever their member says, rather
than to serve or shape a discrete policy mandate or professional community.
Stronger institutional loyalty among congressional staff might be cultivated in several
different ways. At the entry stage, the democratic accountability of members of Congress means
that significant numbers of staffers are and should be hired by the members that will employ
them. A larger number of positions, though, can be filled by professional staff working for
committees than presently is the case. Committees do not feature staffers with sufficient
institutional loyalties to power the institutional autonomy of Congress, but committee staffers are
still at the greatest remove of any current staffers from the sway of elected officials.353 Civil
service examinations akin to those required for many executive branch positions can be required
to join committee staff.
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Alternatively, the relevant professional community can offer its evaluation of the
professional competence of the potential staffer. For instance, the American Bar Association
plays an important role evaluating the credentials of judicial nominees.354 It might also evaluate
the credentials of those applying for a position on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Committee
staffers might only be approved by a vote of either the other staffers and/or the members of the
committee. This could lead to committee staffers being selected on a partisan basis like other
nominees that come to a committee vote are. However, inducing partisan warfare over
committee staff generates an opportunity cost that prevents committees from dealing with more
substantial issues engulfed by partisan warfare, such as judicial nominees. The more time is
spent debating the next committee counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, the less time is
available for debating the next nominee to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
Modifying exit incentives for staffers would also help generate institutional loyalty.
Stronger returns to remaining in Congress can also make a difference for congressional staffers.
Congress enjoys the power of the purse, but opens that purse more to similarly situated executive
branch officials than to their congressional counterparts. A lawyer working for the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”)—even if that lawyer is not in a leadership position at the SEC—
can make over $200,000 a year.355 The senior Democratic lawyer on the Senate Judiciary
Committee, a veteran of several decades, makes roughly eighty percent of that working on the
nomination of Neil Gorsuch to succeed Antonin Scalia and determine the future of the Supreme
Court.356
Exit-related constraints on post-employment lobbying in the private sector, in particular
in relation to issues on which a former staffer worked, would also shift the expected payoffs of
exit versus continued service in Congress.357 The draw of working for the executive branch can
be reduced by constraints on post-employment opportunities in the other branches of
government. Rather than staffers contemplating what will make them an appealing candidate to a
K Street lobbying firm or a presidential candidate or President, constraints on these opportunities
upon leaving Congress will direct their attention towards the legislative branch.
This reimagined congressional staffing model would also generate more of a focused
institutional mandate. Staffers hired to pursue a discrete policy agenda for a committee would
think of themselves as part of a legislative-epistemic community. They would be evaluated and
approved by their fellow committee members. They would also be evaluated and approved by
related professional communities. Rather than considering what serves the electoral interests of
the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the staffer can consider what serves the interests of
the rule of law and Congress’s role in defending it.
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Finally, the institutional dispositions of legislators and their staff might be promoted by
narrowing the available scope for acting on pecuniary motives. Strikingly, the Supreme Court
has recently expanded the scope for legislative self-serving. In its 2016 McDonnell v. United
States decision,358 the unanimous Court narrowed the scope of the “honest services” statute,
which criminalizes fraudulent deprivations of the “intangible right of honest services.”359 Honest
services charges are common in public corruption cases.360 The McDonnell Court held that the
statute only applied when a defendant official “formal[ly] exercise[d] governmental power …
similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing
before a committee.”361 In part, the Court justified this narrowing gloss by the concern that a
broad public-corruption law would “chill” interactions between constituents and their elected
representatives that ought to be protected by the First Amendment.362 McDonnell undermines
efforts to cultivate institutional dispositions because it widens the domain of activity in which
representatives can act upon pecuniary, rather than institutional or public-regarding, reasons.363
In contrast, representatives who are insulated from strong external pulls have a better chance to
focus on institutional concerns. Our analysis thus provides a new ground for critiquing the
McDonnell decision, and favoring broad public-corruption prohibition.364
Conclusion
Every organization struggles with how to ensure that its members act on behalf of its
collective or corporate interests. The molding of atomized, selfish individual actors into
committed institutional loyalists is therefore a problem of organizational design across academic
fields and across our public life. In no domain of organizational life is this problem more
important to consider, and more difficult to solve, than in the context of federal governmental
design. When Madison anticipated the “interests of the man must be connected with the
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constitutional rights of the place,”365 therefore, his aspiration was not distinctive or different
from that of many institutional entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, a conventional wisdom has emerged that the powerfully and personally
motivated interests of the official cannot usually be connected with the constitutional rights of
the place. Scholars have struggled to visualize how a Constitution devised before the existence
of—and without regard to—cohesive and polarized political forces and figures could continue to
operate. The modern (and now rather standard) position is therefore something of the cynical or
pessimistic position. This standard view holds that when the massive power of the federal
government is in play, partisan, ideological, or selfishly material motives will dominate.
Institutional concerns will trail in their wake. Our constitutional system works as it was supposed
to only when what really motivates officials coincidentally overlaps with constitutional
principles. When partisan, ideological or even crudely materialistic interests conflict with
constitutional principles, damage is done to these principles. At a singular, extreme moment, or
with gradual deterioration, this could mean the disappearance of these ancient and valued
principles.
This modern position is too motivationally parsimonious and too pessimistic. Branches,
no less than private associations, can and do cultivate loyal, well-disposed officials capably
motivated to act on the institution’s behalf. These “constitutional rights of the place” must be
consciously cultivated by careful institutional design, and not simply assumed (or assumed
away). To that end, we have identified and taxonomized four mechanisms capable of nurturing
institutional loyalty. Properly deployed, these tools of institutional loyalty can play a central role
in ensuring that our national institutions operate as more than a blind crashing together of
conflicting parts.
Madison was right that “parchment barriers”366 will not protect us when our “dependence
on the people”367 produces the forces or figures that the modern position fears and that threaten
institutional boundaries. Our Constitution is not a “machine that would go of itself.”368 But
Madison was also right that we are not without hope when ideological or partisan passions
overwhelm fragile institutional boundaries. It is at those moments that our system includes
within it other tools to ensure that institutional boundaries persist and persevere. The ambition of
this Article has been to demonstrate the importance and utility of institutional loyalty as one of
these tools to ensure the constitutional machine still works even in moments of stress.
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